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What impact do road user charges have on cost recovery? And
when they fail to cover total costs, how should the resulting
deficit be financed?
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The optimal charge for road use is equal to  'rhe question is, how should this dericit be
variable costs for road maintenance, together  financed'?
with the cosLs  road users impose on other road
users and on the rest of society (usually confined  On roads carrying heavy volumes of traffic,
to the costs of road congestion).  it is Tiot  economically efficient to bridge the
financing gap by cutting back on maintenance.
One persistent question raised about such  The gap has to be bridged by collecting the
charges is what impact they have on cost recov-  required revenues through user charges, or b)
ery.  And when they fail to cover total costs, how  mobilizing additional general tax revenues.  But
the resulting deficit should be financed?  the costs of mobilizing additional general tax
revenues are high and, given the generally low
The theoretical literature argues that if there  price elasticity of demand for roads, it is nearlv
are constant returns to scale in road construction  always more economically efficient to collect the
aand  in road use. the optimal user charge will  required revenues from road users.
recover the capital costs of the road network and
the total expenditures on .ouad  maintenance.  It is generally agreed that marginal costs-
Empirical estimates for such a system of road  corresponding to variable road maintenance
user charges in Tunisia similarly suggest that  costs - should be the floor below which user
they would generate twice the revenues currently  charges should never fall.  But there is no reason
spent on roads.  It seems therefore that optimal  to stop at marginal costs.  An important group of
road user charges would not only recover all  costs are avoidable, attributable to individual
costs but would constribute substantially to  groups of users (although not to the individual
general fiscal revenues.  users  tiiciitscives),  Cuid  ii 3ti.a  - si1
grounds of simplicity, equity, and political
Heggie and Fon examine these issues from  expediency - to charge these costs against the
both theoretical and practical perspectives.  They  appropriate user group.
conclude that there arm  substantial economies of
scale in both road construction and road use.  The remaining costs, although also avoid-
Also, road maintrnance costs include a number  able, are common to all users and, to minimize
of fixed costs that do not vary with traffic (up to  loss of consumer surplus, should be charged to
lhalf  of annual expenditures on road maintenance  them using the inverse elasticity rule (Ramsey
are usually fixed). Moreover, since roads cannot  pricing).
be smoothly adjusted to traffic, maiginal costs
for the entire road network are significantly  Heggie and Fon point out that there are
lower than avc,rage  costs in most developing  significant dif'ferences between current user
countries, unless capacity is artificiall)  con-  charges in Tunisia and the user charges calcu-
strained by environnmental  or other constraints.  lated using the avoidable cost methodology
Ulnder  these (realistic) conditions, optimal user  described in this paper.
charges result in a substantial financial deficit.
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Executive Swaumary
i.  Current theories of road pricing argue that net economic  benefits will be maximized
when prices are set equal to short-run marginal costs (variable road maintenance  costs and the
costs of externalities, usually confined to  road congestion).  Several empirical studies have
rlaimed to show that such a system of user charges would cover the entire costs of the road
network and make a reasonable  contribution  to overall fiscal revenues. (Paras 1-3).
ii.  The above conclusions  have been formalized into two theorems: (i) if there are
constant  returns to scale in road construction  and in road use, the optimal  user charge will recover
the  capital costs of the road network  and total expenditures  on road maintenance;  and «ii) if, in
addition, heavy vehicles  are confined  to the outer lanes of roads with four or more lanes and all
road damage  is attributable  to traffic, the optimal user charge  will recover the capital costs of the
road network and twice total expenditures  on road maintenance.  (Para 5).
iii.  Since  roads with four or more lanes  comprise  less than 10 percent of the road network
in most countries, the second proposition  has limited application. rne  paper therefore focusses
on the first theorem, applies it to roads in Tunisia and shows that the optimal user charges (as
defined by  the model) do  not cover total expenditures on  road  maintenance and make no
contribution  to capital  costs. The paper then  examines  how  to finance  the balance  of the unfunded
expenditures  in the most economically  efficient way.  The paper does not examine distributional
issues, how much road users should contribute to overall fiscal revenues, the choice of pricing
instrument, or how pricing strategies  affect the costs of supplying  roads. (Para 5).
iv.  Optimal theories of  road pricing are based on  a  series of explicit and implicit
assumptions. They assume: (I) the road network has a fixed length  and is subjected  to a constant
flow of traffic; (II) the road network has a uniform age distribution  and the road agency adopts
a condition-responsive  maintenance  strategy;  (III)  road capacity  can be smoothly  adjusted  to traffic
so that the entire road network is in equilibrium; (IV)  vehicle operating  costs are linearly related
to the average  roughness  of the road pavement;  (V) routine  maintenance  costs are zero; (VI) there
are constant  returns to scale in road construction;  and (VII) there are constant  returns to scale in
road use (i.e. the time related cost function is homogenous  of degree 0).  The effect of these
assumptions  is to ensure that the optimal user charge (levied  to cover road damage  and congestion
costs) exactly covers the annualized costs of the road network and variable expenditures on
periodic road maintenance.  (Pams 6-21).
v.  Assumptions I,  II  and IV  are either reasonable simplifying assumptions, or  are
unavoidable  in the interests  of simplifying  the analysis,  (Paras 23-25). The remaining  assumptions
are too strong.  Periodic maintenance  costs do not all vary with traffic; between 20 percent and
65 percent of these costs are fixed (assumption  V).  Routine maintenance  costs likewise are not
zero; they account for nearly half total road maintenance  costs and an estimated 30 percent are
variable.  On inter-urban roads there are likewise strongly increasing  returns to scale in roadv
construction  (aamption  VI) and in road use (assumption  VIID; on urban roads this is partly off-
set by -Ising land valucs. Finally, roads cannot be smoothly  adjusted to traffic (assumption  III);
they are not infinitely  divisible  and always operating at their optimal capacity. (Paras 26-29).
vi.  When the above assumptions  are relaxed, the optimal pricing model breaks down.
Relaxation  of assumptions  V, VI and VII all lead to the same result:  when they are relaxed, the
optimal  user charges fall short of the annualized  costs of the road network and total expenditures
on road maintenance. In each case, relaxation  of the assumption  brings in scale economies  which
leads to attendant deficits when prices are set equal to marginal costs.  Finally, assumption  III
cannot really be relaxed; it follows as a consequence  of using differential calculus.  It requires
that the costs of congestion on each km of road be just equal to the costs of adding a margina
increment in road capacity.  This  takes no  account of the substantial spatial and tempora
variations  in road traffic and, since indivisibilities  are generally  recognized  to be a source  of scale
economies,  autou-iicoly  causes deficits when prices are set equal to marginal  costs.  (Paras 30-
36).
vii.  When the optimal pricing model is applied to Tunisia, and the costs of urban roac
congestion are estimated using a traffic simulation  model (Annex 2), the resulting user charges
only cover just over half the total costs incurred.  User charges set on the basis of the above
optimal  pricing model  will therefore  leave a large block q'f  expenditures  unifunded.  (Paras 37-38).
viii.  The remainder of the paper considers  how to finance these unfunded  expenditures  in
the most economically  efficient way.  It focusses  on roads carrying significant  volumes of traffic
and considers the options of raising user charges or using general tax revenues (it does not
consider taxes on beneficiaries  which are normally  only relevant on roads carrying low volumes
of traffic and primarily  providing  access to property). The options are examined  in terms of their
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associated  with marginal cost pricing have to be financed. This introduces the costs of general
taxation (deadweight  and administrative  costs) associated with financing these deficits.  Th
conclusion from this analysis is that, provided the administrative  costs of road user taxes are
similar to general revenue taxes, the welfare costs of marginal  cost pricing  plus general taxation
_ _  _~~..16  !1__1_  4.  t_L:_  *t.__*._  -14J;A  _-  c*  A  -
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It  follows that a  pricing system which raises the extra revenues from users using optimal
departures from marginal cost pricing will be more attractive in welfare terms. (Paras 39-44).
ix.  The paper introduces the concept  of avoidability to classify the costs of operating,
maintaining  and improving  the road network. Three levels of avoidability  are identified: (i) costs
which are variable and incurred on behalf of identifiable  users; (ii) costs which can be avoided
over a short period of time and are incurred on behalf of an identifiable  group of users (but not
the individual  member  of the group); and (iii) costs which are common  to all users and can onl!
be avoided by closing the road network.  In Tunisia, these categories  account for 29, 26 and 4'
percent respectively of  total road expenditures.  It is  suggested that the first group, being
marginal, should be recovered from users in terms of veh-km (for variable routine maintenancevi
costs) and ESA-hm  (for variable periodic maintenance  costs).  Since the second category are
avoidable, it is suggested  they should be recovered uniformly  from the groups olt whose behalf
they are incurred: in terms of ESA-km  (for heavy vehicles)  and in terms of PCE-km (to expand
road capacity for rural and urban road  users). (Paras 45-48).
x.  The paper shows  that the most economically  efficient way of financing  the remaining
collective  common  costs, is by using thc inverse  elasticity  rule.  This minimizes  the relative  loss
of consumer  surplus  per dollar of collective  common  costs covered by each user  group. It is done
by equalizing the ratios of the mark-up over base-costs  (variable and grouped common  costs),
divided by the sum of the respective supply and demand elasticities, for each user group.  The
procedure is illustrated  in graphical  form and is solved using trial-and-error. (Paras 49-52).
xi.  The paper also looks at the scope for financing  common  costs by way of congestion
charges.  It concludes, based on a review recently  completed  by the World Bank, that most road
congestion  in developing  countries is attributable  to the poor performance  of the road agency; it
is self-inflicted. The overall conclusions  are that:  (i) serious road congestion  is limited to about
twenty large cities in the Bank's developing member countries; (ii)  inethods of charging for
congestion  are limited and difficult to administer; and (iii) the charging method selected will be
determined  by the nature of the city, the administrative  complexity  of the charging instrument,
and its affordability.  Since serious (non-self inflicted) congestion is limited in  developing
countries, it will make little contribution  to cost recovery  for the road network  as a whole. (Paras
53-60).
xii.  Finally, the paper applies the above  pricing model  to Tunisia  and concludes  that, when
the mark-ups are applied to all vehicles, it results in lower charges for cars and much higher
charges for all other vehicles.  Without pure taxation  of freight vehicles (i.e. the mark-ups are
applied to passenger vehicles only),  the charges for most vehicles  e  lQ  ivurly  ithl b±iiie.  Tlhey
are, nevertheless, much higher for buses, lower for gasoline cars and higher for heavy trucks.
(Paras 61-64).
xiii.  The overall conclusions  of the paper are: (i) it is unrealistic to assume there are
r-crurns  tow  scale in  road construction and in  road  use and to  ignore routine road
maintenance  costs; (ii) roads canrot be smoothly  adjusted to traffic, so that the marginal  costs of
the entire road network will usually  be lower than average  costs; (iii) congestion  charges may be
justifiable in the limited number of cities experiencing  serious road congestion,  but the revenues
from these charges are unlikely  to cover the common  costs for the road network  as a whole; (iv)
it is nearly always more economical to collect the revenues required to cover unfunded road
expenditures  by raising user charges using to the inverse elasticity rule (rather than by using
general tax revenues); and (v) there are significant  differences  between current road user charges
in Tunisia and those calculated  using the above avoidable  cost methodology.  (Paras 65-66).I.  INTROL'UCTION
1.  Economists  have repeatedly urged governments  to  "get prices right" or,  more
strongly,  have argued  that "getting  prices right [might  not be] the end of economic  development,
but getting prices wrong frequently  is" (Meier, 1983, pp. 1 and 231; Timmer, 1987, p. 39).
Prices influence  resource allocation,  revenue mobilization  and the distribution  of income; they
provide the indispensable  information  needed to reach rational  economic  decisions  on what and
how much to produce.  To maximize  net economic  benefits, prices should be set equal to the
social external costs directly  attributable  to a small increase  or decrease in output, i.e., equal to
short-run marginal  costs.  In the case of roads, these prices (or optimal user charges) are equal
to the value of the resources consumed  when using the road.  They consist of the damage  done
to the road surface (variable road maintenance  costs) and the additional  costs (usually  confined
to congestion costs) which each user imposes on other road users and on the rest of society
(Walters, 1968; Churchill, 1972).
2.  One of the persistent  queries raised by the above pricing rule is what impact  it has
on cost recovery and, when it results in deficits, how these should be finianced. One of the
seminal works on  road user charging reached the following conclusion, "on the rural and
interurban  highways, the revenue collected from user charges at marginal costs is likely to be
insufficient to cover the (annualized) investment cost of the roads; whereas in the case of
congested  city streets it is likely that the revenue from marginal  cost pricing will be more than
sufficient to meet the total costs".  It also argued, however, that "we find that there are no
grounds for requiring a particular road, a class of roads, or the highway system as a whole to
cover its costs by user charges" (Walters, 1968, p.  114).  On the other hand, the author also
claimed  there was no overwhelming  presumption  that such user charges would  necessarily  result
in large deficits. This was an empirical question and the only way to test the consequences  of
usine ontimal user charges was to calculate  them to sq( whe-ther  they racidtZ  ;ind1eficeits.
3.  Initial results  from calculating such  charges were encouraging.  A  rough
calculation  for Thailand during the 1960s  suggested  that optimal  user charges would  have raised
existing  road user revenues  from between  $40 and $50 million  p.a. to over $60 million  (Walters,
196R.  nn. 226-227' and a more detailed  htlldV  nf  five  rn,mtripe  1n  i'antr.31  AnMV  e^nc  A
that "the net impact of these changes [in road user charges] would  be to raise public revenues
from user taxes by 32 percent to 50 percent, depending  on the country" (Churchill, 1972, p. 3).
Recent estimates  for Tunisia  likewise suggest  that optimal  user charges  would generate  twice the
revenues currently spent on roads (Newbery et al,  1988).  These results are nevertheless
critically dependent  on the estimated costs of congestion  and there are reasons to believe that
some of the estimates  were too high. A more cautious approach  results in estimates  of optimal
user charges which are significantly  lower.j/
I/  WWaters,  1968,  bases  his estinate  on the cosa of congestion  on urban highways  in the UK (pp. 178 and 226) where
avemgc per capita GNP was nearly thitte¢n  times  that  in Ihailand. Estimated  tavel time costs, and hence  the yield
of a congeston  tax, may therefore  be too  high.  Newbery, et aI,  1988, liks  assume AU  urban traffic in Tunisia
is congested  and  assume  very high  m  argua  time  cots.  Annex 1 of this paper suggests  the estimates  for Tunisia  may
also be too high.2
4.  11wd  ulwreeai  hiU;&idrX.  *!  -. ~.'-  obsuf  na_ginal  cost
pricing on  cost recovery.  An early analytical model showed that an optimal pricing and
investment  strategy  would  be exactly  self-financing  if there were constant  returns to scale in road
construction. When there were decreasing  returns it would earn a surplus, while if there were
increasing returns  it  would incur a  deficit (Mohring and  Harwitz,  1962).  The  model
nevertheless  ignored  road maintenance  costs and was recognized  as being too simplistic. A more
recent model has overcome some of these objections and has arrived at the folI. wing two
propositions:  (i) if there are constant returns to scale in road construction  and in road use, then
the optimal road user charge will recover the capital costs of the road network and the total
expenditures  on road maintenance;  and (ii) if, in addition, heavy vehicles are confined  to the
slow lanes (i.e.,  the outer lanes on roads with four or  more lanes) and all road damage is
attributable  to traffic, the optimal  user charge will recover the capital costs of the road neLwork
and twic  the total expenditures  on road maintenance.
5.  The second proposition has limited application, since few countries have many
four-lane roads.  In the U.S.A., only 8.4 percent of the paved road network (excluding  local
roads) have four or more lanes and the proportion in Japan is 3.5 percent, Mexico 3.5 percent
and Tunisia 1.0 percent.  These roads usually carry between 5 to  10 percent of total traffic.
Engineers furthermore take account of differential  use when designing road pavements.  The
following  paper therefore concentrates  on the first proposition,  applies  it to the road network in
Tunisia (as described in Newbery et al, 1988) and shows that the optimal user charges do not
cover the total expenditures  on road maintenance  and make  no contribution  to capital  costs. The
paper then examines  ways of recovering  these costs in the most economically  efficient manner.
It is also important to say what the paper does not do.  It does not deal with the impact of
pricing  policies  on income  distribution,  does not examine  what contribution  the road sector might
be expected  o make  iu overall  fiscal  reveiues,  ii  noi  dalca wiul  Ulf choicc of  charging
instrument  (i.e., whether, and how, to use licence  fees, fuel taxes, sales  and excise  taxes, import
duties, etc. to collect road user revenues)  and does not deal with noise, air pollution and other
externalities. It likewise does not deal with the important  relationship  between the choice of
pricing strategy and the impact this has on management  incentives  and hence on the costs of
suppiying  road services.3
II.  OPTEMAL  PRICING MODEL
6.  In their attempt to derive  optimal  road user charges, Mohring  and Harwitz (1962)
considered  the problem of maximizing  long-run  net benefits. Net benefits,  NB, equal consumer
private benefits minus total costs.  Consumer  private benefits, PB(N), are a function of the
number  of trips, or le-!el  of traffic, N, and can be represented  as the area underneath  the demand
curve.2/  Total costs, TC(N,w), are assumed to depend on the level of traffic N and highway
capacity w, a function of the width of the road measured  in number of lanes of standard width.
The TC function has t--o components, The first is users' total costs, N VV(N,w).  The term
VV,  the time-cost function per  trip, or the  vehicle operating cost (VOC), increases with
increases  in N and with decreases  in w.  The second  component  of TC is the capital expenditure
for roads and is written r-KK(w) where r is the interest rate for public investments  and KKw(w)
>  zero.j/  Note that this formulation  of costs omits all road maintenance  costs. The problem
here is to choose the optimal level of traffic N and capacity w to maximize net benefits:
Mdx  NB =  PB(N) - TC(N,w)
=  PB(N) - [NVW(N,w)  +  r'KK(w)l
7.  In this formulation,  the marginal  private benefits of the trip, MPBN  are given by
the derivative  of PB(N).  The marginal social costs of the trip, MSCN,  or the additional  social
costs due to an additional trip, are given by the partal derivative of TC(N,w) with respect to
N, which is equal to the partial derivative  of N*W(N,w) with respect to N, or, [VV(N,w) +
N'WN(N,w)J.  Since W  is the VOC borne by users, it is the marginal  private cost of the trip,
MPCN. Since  N-VVN(N,w)  denotes  the additional  congestion  costs imposed  on other users from
one more trip, we call this the marginal external costs of the trip. MEC..  Therefore, we see
that MSCN  equals MPCN  +  MECN. The net marginal costs of highway  capacity are given by
the partial derivative of  TC(N,w) with respect to  w, which is equal to  NWVV,(N,w)  +
r KK(w).  The term N*WwV(N,w)  is negative and denotes the decrease in time-costs when
highway capacity is expanded; it therefore represents benefits to  users.  We will refer to
-N*WV(N,w) as  the  marginal private benefits of  expanding capacity, MPBW,,.  The term
rKK(w)  represents  additional  road costs and will be called marginal road costs of expanding
capacity, MRCW.  To conclude, the net marginal  costs of highway  capacity are equal to marginal
road costs of capacity minus marginal private benefits of capacity, or, [MRCW  - MPBW].
8.  'he  optimal levels of traffic and highway capacity must satisfy the first-order
conditions for maximizing  net benefits.  These conditions are found by equating the partial
V  The  notatiots  used in this  paper is clour to that  of Neaery (1987).
I/  We shall  abus  the standard  mamaial  notation  for partil derivatives  by also  ui ing it to denote derivatives.4
derivatives of ND with respect to N and w to zero.  With the help of the notation introduced
above, we can easily see that the conditions  are as follows:
MPBN =  MSCN = MPCN  + MECN  (1)
MPB.  =  MRCW.  (2)
In words, equation (1) says that the marginal  private benefits from an additional  trip should be
equated to the sum of private VOCs (VV) and the marginal external costs of this trip (due to
congestion). Equation (2) rays that the marginal private benefits of additional  capacity (due to
reduction in  time costs) should be  equated to  the  marginal costs of  additional highway
capacity.A/
9.  From the maximization  condition (1), we see that in order to have an efficient
-ghway svstem, the external  costs from congestion  must be internalized. That is, an appropriate
congestion  charge equal to MECN  should  be levied. The remaining  question  is to find out when
revenue from congestion  charges will cover the road costs.  Assume that V  V is homogeneous
of degree 0 in N and w, meaning  that doubling  both traffic and highway  capacity leaves VOCs
unchanged, and that KK is homogeneous  of degree 1 in w,  meaning that there are neither
economies  nor diseconomies  of scale in highway construction. Under these assumptions,  the
optimal user taxes would be just sufficient to cover all road costs.  Since this model will be
generalized  and discussed  carefully later, we defer the explanation  of cost recovery until then.
10.  Because road width, w, does not enter the demand function dirxtly  and only
influences  total costs, the problem of maximizing  net benefits  decomposes  into two stages.  For
any given N, minimize  total costs of supplying  that N.  This yields the optimal  highway  capacity
w  as a  function of N,  w  =  g(N).5/  Then in  the sLcond stage, solve:  Max  PB(N) -
TC(N,g(N)) to find the optimal amount of traffic
11.  Specifically,  an efficient highway  system can therefore  be found by first solving
the total cost minimization  problem:
Min  TC = NVV(N,w) +  r KK(w)  (3)
to find the optimal  highway  capacity,  assuming that the level of traffic N is constant.  This
means that the partial  derivative  of  TC with  respect to  w  must be set  to  zero,  giving
MPB, = MRC,, as in equation (2).  Since MPB  depends  on w as well as N, otie must make
sure that the level of traffic N is also optimal. This means that N must satisfy  equation (1). Or,
d/  lt  should be noted  that  the Lrst-order  conditions  (1) and (2) are only necessay but not sufficient.  Mohring and
Harwitz  implicitly  asumed  the existence  of the second-order  sufficient  conditions.
I/1  In pratice, the first-order  condition,  (2),  for total  cost  minimization  may  not  present  w as an  explicit  function  of N.
W/ith  fth help  of Implicit  Function  ITeorem,  w' can indood  be thought  of a  a function  of N.S
MPBN  must be made equal to MSCN by imposing  a congestion  charge of MECN. In general,
to describe the efficient  highway  system,  it is sufficient  to investigate  the problem of minimizing
total costs and apAlying  MECN as the optimal tax.  In fact, this approach was adopted by
Newbery (1987), who extends the model of Mohring and Harwitz (1962) by incorporating
maintenance  costs.
12.  The following presents the essence of  Newbery's model mathematically. It
contains three important implicit assumptions: (i) the road network has a fixed length and is
subjected to a constant flow of traffic per lane (assumption  I); (ii) the road network has a
uniform age distribution anal the highway agency adopts a condition-responsive  maintenance
regime (assumption  ID);  and (iii) road capacity can be smoothly  adjusted to traffic, so that the
entire road network is in equilibrium (assumption  III).  These assumptions,  together with the
explicit mathematical  assumptions  made in this section, are discussed in section 3.
13.  Newbery considers the problem of minimizing total costs when choosing an
optimal highway  capacity w with pavement  strength S.  There are three parts to the total cost
function. First are the VOCs, which consist of overhead  costs v 0, time related  costs per km V,
and wear and tear to the vehicle.  Item V is an increasing function of traffic flow N and a
decreasing function of  highway capacity w.  That is,  we have V(N,w) with VN  >  0 and
V,  <  0.  The wear and tear on the vehicle is assumed to be linearly dependent on average
roughness, written as bR, where b is positive  and R represents  average roughness  (assumption
IV).  Therefore, the total vehicle operating costs to al  users are N (v,+V(N,w)+bR).
14.  The second  component  of total costs are the annualized  costs  per kilometer  of road
construction. It is specified  as a function of highway  capacity w and strength S and is written
as r.[KO+wK(S)], where r is the cost of funds, Ko is a non-negative  constant and Ks >  0.
When Ko  is zero, the construction  costs corresponds  to the case of constant  returns to expanding
road cpacity,  holding road strength constant.fi/  The case of increasing returns to scale is
reflected  in Ks being positive.
15.  The last component in  the total costs are the annual maintenance  costs per
kilometer, w.M(D/w,S), where D/w represents  the number  of equivalent  standard  axles (ESAs)
per unit of capacity and the maintenance  cost function  per lane M is an increasing function  of
Diw, and a decreasing  function of S.  That is, MD},.  >  0 and M8 < 0.  The term D, the number
of heavy axles, is assumed to be N-E, the total traffic flow N times the vehicles' avexage
damaging power E.Z/  Road maintenance costs, M,  are  assumed to  consist of  periodic
/  When  Ks  is zero, ruwK(S) in this  model  extendS  the  capital  investment  function  r.KK(w) in the previous  model  when
KK is homognous of degree 1 by incorporting an  additional  vaiable S.
1/  We simplify  Ntwbery's  model by usumdng  that there  is only one type of vehicle. If many types of vehicles are
considerd, then D is the sum of the product of traffic low of ewh type of vehicle and the repetive  an  Sge
damaging  power  of this  type over  all typer.6
(resurfacing)  cost  only.  Routine maintenance  is ignored (assumption  V).  Note that in this
formulation,  road maintenance  costs omit fixed maintenance  custs and any maintenance  costs
which may depend  on the volume of traffic, rather than on the passage of heavy vehicles.
16.  The road system is optimally  designed  by first choosing  values of capacity w and
strength S to minimize  total costs:
Min  TC = N [v*+V(N,w)+bRJ  + r [K+wK(S)]  +  w M(D/w,S). (4)
By taking the partial derivatives of TC with respect to w and S and equating  them to zero, we
have the minimization  conditions:J/
N V,  +  rK  + M +  wMD,,(-D/w-) = 0  (5)
r'wK8 +  wMs  =  0.  (6)
Rewriting  equations (5) and (6), we have
-N-V,, = rK  +  M - (D/w)MD,W  (7)
w*Ms  =  r*w'Ks.  (8)
17.  The left-hand side of (7), representing  the reduction  in user time-costs  due to an
additional  lane, is the marginal private benefit of capacity MPB,.  The first two terms on the
right-hand side of (7) represent the increased costs of adding capacity, since K is the road
construction  costs per unit of capacity and M are the variable periodic  maintenance  costs of that
unit of capacity. The last term in (7) represents  the reduction  in periodic  maintenance  costs per
unit of capacity since an additional unit of capacity  reduces the number  of heavy axles per unit
of capacity and hence decreases the total periodic maintenance  costs of the road.  The three
right-hand  terns sum to become  the marginal  costs of adding  an additional  unit of capacity; they
can also be written as r*K +  M(1 - O), where t  is the elasticity of M with respect to D/w.
Equation  (7) therefore prescibes that for an optimally  designed roadway, the marginal benefit
of adding capacity should equal the marginal costs of capacity.  For  this conclusion to be
meaningfui,  it must be assumed that road capacity can be smoothily  aujusted to traffic (as per
assumption  p).
18.  Likewise, the left-han(  'de of (8) represents  the marginal benefits of additional
strength through  a reduction in periodic maintenance  costs (M8 is negative),  and the right-hand
side of (8) represents  the marginal increase  in road construction  costs due to additional  strength.
Equation (8) then prescribes that an optimally  designed roadway should choose the strength of
roads appropriately  so as to eq  marginal  benefits  of strength with marginal costs of strength.
U  In the following,  we suppru  the arguma  of al fwcions to faciltte the undenanding of vanous conditions. Like
Mohring  and Harwitz,  Newbery  implicitly  auumed the exisence of the  econd-order  sufficient  conditions.7
With these interpretations,  one can easily see why equations  (7) and (8) extend equation (2) in
the prcvious simpler model.
19.  To ensure that the right level of traffic N is induced, the marginal external  costs
must be internalized  through taxes, as was mentioned  earlier.  To determine the road tax, we
need to know the marginal social costs of traffic MSCN,  which is the partial derivative  of TC
with respect to N.  In this case, we have:
MSCN =  [vO+V(N,w)+bRJ  +  N-VN +  E'MDI,.  (9)
The first three terms consist of the VOCs  and represent  the user's marginal  private costs MPCN.
The term N-VN  represents the external costs imposed  on other road users through congestion.
The last term EMDW,  which is the simplification  of the partial derivative of w*M  with respect
to N, or,  w*MDj,.(E/w),  represents the additional periodic maintenance  costs caused by the
additional traffic.  Hence the last two terms together become the marginal external costs of
traffic, MECN,  or,
MECN =  NVN  +  EMD,w.  (10)
As noted before, MECN, is the efficient road tax for each user.  In fact, it is readily seen that
the unit congestion charge should be N-VN  and the unit road damage tax should be EMD,I.
Note how equation (9) extends the right-hand  equality  in equation (1).
20.  To extend his analysis, Newbery assumes constant returns to  scale in  road
construction  with respect to capacity,  holding  road strength  constant,  so that  Ko = 0 (assumption
VI).  He also assumes that the time related cost function V is homogeneous  of degree 0
(tuIIIpdoII  VMI).2i  By definition, V homogeneous of degree U means that:
V(&N,arw) =  a°eV(N,w)  =  V(N,w).
The above equation says that doubling traffic and highway capacity (oa  =  2) leaves the time
related  costs V the same. That is, as far as the users' time-costs  are concerned, it is the average
traffic  per unit of capacity not the absolute  amounts  of traffic and capacity, that counts. In other
words, measured in terms of user time-costs, additional capacity is the same as the average
capacity. By Euler's equation, V homogeneous  of degree 0 implies that:
N*VN  +  W'V,  = 0.  (11)
2/  Thecse  two homogneity  assumption  wee  also adopted  by Mohring  and Harwitz.8
It is easier to understand  equation (11) if it is rewritten as:
(N/w)VN  =  -V,.  (12)
The right-hand  side of (12), -V4,  gives  the time-cost  saving  due to additional  capacity, since V.
< 0.  This saving  in time-costs  from additional  capacity  can be translated  to saving  in time-costs
due to a decrease in traffic.  When V is homogeneous  of degree 0, having one more unit of
capacity is equivalent to having N/w less traffic.  We therefore conclude that (N/w)*VN  gives
the capacity-equivalent  savings in time-costs  due to a decrease in traffic.
21.  The total revenues raised from the congestion  charges, G', and the total revenue
raised from the road damage  charge, Gd, are as follows:
G; =  N*(N*VN),
Gd  =  N-(E*MDJ).
Meanwhile,  the average road costs per trip borne by the highway  authority will be referred to
as the average  road costs per trip ARCN-  Since the first term in (4) is borne privately, the last
two terms represent the road costs borne by the highway agency.  Hence we have:
ARCN  =  (r-w-K +  wM)/N  since Ko is assumed to be zero
=  (r-K +  M)lW/N)
-=  (D/w).MD,.  - N  V,,J'(w/N)  by  (7)
=  E*MD/, - w*V,,  since  D  =  N*E
=  E-MDIW  +  N*VN  by  (11)
=  MECN  by  (10).
From the above calculation, we also readily see that:
G'  +  Gd =  N(NVN  +  E'MDIW)  =N(rwK  +  w M)/N  =  rw-K  +  w-M.
Hence we see that, if there are constant returns to scale in road construction  and in road use,
then the optimal road user  charge, GI + Gd,  will cover the annualized  capital  costs of the road
network and the total (variable] expenditures  on periodic road maintenance.  In spite of its
familiar tone, this result is a little surprising: while all of the (total as well as average) road
costs are borne  by the highway  agency, only part  of the marginal  external  cost (E'MD/) is borne
by it.  However, given that all of MECN  is taxed as the unit tax, which becomes  the average  tax
revenues, and that appropriate assumptions  guarantee  the equality  of ARCN  and MECN, it then
becomes  clear that total tax revenues will exactly  balance total road costs.9
m.  ASSUMIONS  UNDERLYING  OPTIMAL  PRICING
22.  The above pricing model is based on two important sets of assumptions.  The first
set deal with the nature of the road network and its usage (assumption I), the condition of the
road  pavement  and  the  type  of  road  maintenance  regime  adopted  by  the  highway  agency
(assumption  II),  and  the effect  of  pavement  conditions  on  vehicle  operating  costs  (VOCs)
(assumption IV).  These assumptions appear reasonable and are merely introduced to simplify
the analysis.  The second set relate to the way road maintenance costs are specified (assumption
V), the construction cost  function (assumption VI), the nature of the congestion cost  function
(assumption VI),  and the relationship between congestion costs and adjustments to road capacity
(assumption 1II).  These assumptions are also introduced to simplify the analysis, but do so at
the expense of making the model unrealistic.  Furthermore,  they cannot easily be avoided and
have an important effect on cost recovery.
3.1  Accentable Simnlifving Assurngtlons
23.  Assumption I is that the road network has a fixed length and there is a constant
flow of traffic per km.  Extending the road network  therefore reduces the traffic flow per kin,
while growth in traffic increases it (hence partly offsetting the effect of extending the network).
The optimum pricing model is therefore  formulated in static,  rather than dynamic terms.  The
prices  calculated  from  the  model  only  apply at  a  particular  point  in  time  and  need  to  be
recalculated each time the network is extended and/or there are changes in the volume of traffic.
Although the model could be reformulated in a dynamic setting, this would complicate the model
and hinder interpretation of the results (Newbery,  1987, p. 3).  Provided the model is only used
to estimate user charges for a particular point in time, anld  is  ri4x!i!  re eztimat^!  tz 
account of changes in road lengths and traffic volumes, the first assumption is reasonable in the
interests of simplification.
24.  Assumption II deals with the strength and condition  of  the road pavement.  It
'iuntes  th.o  !m.iiante. (i) the road network  is taken to be made up of individual  road sections
with uniformly distributed ages; and (ii) the highway agency is assumed to operate a condition-
responsive maintenance regime (i.e.,  road maintenance is carried out when each section of road
reaches a pre-specified terminal degree of roughness).  This means that the average roughness
of the road pavement remains constant across  the entire road network.  This is a fairly strong
assumption, since there are historical rhythms in the building of roads and significant parts of
the road network usually become due for rehabilitation at the same time (Gakenheimer,  1989).
Highway agencies are,  furthermore,  generally prevented from adopting a condition-responsive
maintenance regime  by  external budgetary  constraints.  The average  roughness of  the road
network can therefore vary quite widely.  For exam,ple, between 1979 and 1984, average road
roughness in Brazil increased by nearly one percent each year (see Table  1), while the average10
roughness of paved roads in  Ethiopia and Ghana decreased by  15 percent and 8 percent
respectively  between 1984 and 1988, and in Sudan and Nigeria increased by 3 percent and 2
percent respectively  over the same time period (Harral and Faiz, 1988, Table A-2; Mason and
Thriscutt, 1989, Table 3).  At times the actual roughness of the road pavement will thus be
higher than the long-term average, while at others it will be lower.  This creates an awkward
inconsistency. A sub-optimal  road maintenance  regime  delivers  perverse signals to users. When
road maintenance  is reduced, roughness  increases  and this increases  VOCs: lower road quality
thus costs road users more, while higher quality  costs less.  The assumption  of constant average
roughness  is nevertheless  unavoidable  in the interests of simplifying  the analysis.
Table 1.  Changing Condition of Brazil's Road Network
(percent and weighted average)
Cbange
-1979-  -1984--  1979-1984
Road Condition  km  et  Ian  perce  percent
Good  10,000  24  14,000  30
Fair  23,000  58  19,000  42
Poor  7,000  18  13,000  28
Weightod  Averae
weghs  (a)  1S6  163  4.5
weigbts  (b)  135  141  3.8
(a) Good - 1.0, Fair =  1.5, Poor - 2.5.
(bh  (iood  - 1.U, tatr =  1U, roor - X.u.
Note:  lbe  increm in the  -ber  of roads  in good condition  was caused by new constuion.
About 6,000m  of newpaed roadswes  added to thedetwork, while2,000km formerly
i  good  codon  decined to fair.
Soums  (Hd  and Fa4z,  1988, Boz 1-3)
25.  Assumption  IV assumes that vehicle operating costs are a linear function of
the average roughness  of the road pavement. This is a reasonable  assumption. Although  they
are not strictly a linear function  of the average  roughness,  they are nearly  so and the discrepancy
is of little practical importance.  This is illustrated in Figure 1 for Tunisia.  Since the figures
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3.2  lSnaicwptable^mD1itfing  Assumptiion
26.  Assumption  V assumes  that road maintenance  costs consist exclusively  of the
variable costs of the periodic overlays (resurfacing) which are applied to the road pavement
every 10 to 20 years.  The fixed costs of this periodic maintenance,  which  account for between
20 percent and 65 prcent  of these costs, have been omitted..lQ/ These periodic expenditures
are incurred at intervals greater  an one year and consist of surface dressing and overlays for
paved roads and re-graveling for un-paved roads.  Note that, on an individual road,  such
expenditur  would normally  be treated as fixed costs.  However, since  between one-tenth and
one-twendeth  of the road network  is resurfaced each year, these expenditures  can be treated like
1Q/  Thc  propodaau  of the overlay  cow which  am  xd  are  specifid in tems of climatic  conditions  a  follow:
dry non-froze  - 20%, dry frez  - 45X, wet non-fiez  - 30%, and wet freeze - 65%  (Newbery,  at
&I,  18.  p. 84).12
marginal  costs.  The model also ignores all routine maintenance  costs, which generally  account
for at least half total road maintenance  expenditures.il/  Routine maintenance amounts to
between $1,000 and $3,000 per km for paved roads and between $500 and $1,500 per km for
unpaved  roads, depending  on the country  and volume  of traffic.  Up to 70 percent of these costs
are typically  fixed, the remainder  being attributable  to the passage  of vehicles (patching)  and the
incidence  of heavy vehicles (e.g., shoulder maintenance).
__Vefta Profil  D  _  _
Tuvfajn  Roswa
4  2  a  ,1.
300  000 
3.
/  2  4
122  ~~/Q  /
Number of Lanes
N1i  Shoulderan  arnll  1.5 m wide, pavemcents  ae3.5,  7.0 and 2 x  ?.0 m wide and the
2-lane  road has a S m central reservation.
sow=  Amedo-C:n  r  1990.
I  ,~~~~~~I
liS=  2:  &,onornis  of Scalc in Constructing  Inter-Urban  Roads
D1  In Arizona, U.S.A.,  with over 100,000 Ian of road  and sw,  fixed costs accounted for about 65 per cent
of annual rod  ma_nac  expendkuu  in 1989 (Arizona De-partment of Transportation,  1989).13
27.  Assumption  VI deals with the costs of road construction. These are specified
as, K. + wK(S), where K, is a constant term reflecting  the incidence  of economies  of scale in
road construction. To simplify  the analysis, it is assumed  there are constant returns to scale in
road construction so that Ko is  equal to  zero.  The author recognizes this assumption is
unrealistic, since there are substantial  economies  of scale in constructing  non-urban  roads up to
four lanes.  This is illustrated in figure 2; it is based on empirical data trom several countries
and is equally applicable to Tunisia.  In urban areas, on the other hand, rising land values
increases the average cost function and this decreases the effect of increasing  returns to scale.
The two effects may therefore cancel out in urban areas and the assumption  of constant returns
to scale may be reasonable  (Newbery, 1987, p. 9; Small et al, 1989, pp. 101-102). However,
urban roads in developing  countries  generally  account  for less than 20 percent of the paved road
network and perhaps 10 percent  of the classified network (the figures for Tunisia are  19.1
percent and 10.5 percent  respectively)  (Paterson, 1985) and even in developed  countries they
still only account  for between 18 percent (USA)  and 47 percent (W. Germany)  of the total road
network (Annual Bulletin, 1986, Table 11).  When applied to an entire road network, the
assumption  of constant returns to scale in road construction  is therefore too strong.
28.  Assumption  VII assumes  that  the time costs associated  with traffic congestion
are homogeneous  of degree zero in N and w.  In other words, if the volume of traffic doubles
and the number  of lanes is doubled, vehicle speeds  will remain the same. This is unfortunately
untrue.  Regardless  of whether road capacity is compared on the basis of constant speeds, or
constant levels of service (LOS), which describe how the interactions  between vehicles  affect
road  speeds and capacity, it is clearly not directly related to  the number of  lanes.  The
relationship  between these two quantities  is illustrated  in Figure 3.  It is based on generic data
and therefore applies to all countries, including  Tunisia. The continuous  lines refer to constant
speeds and the broken lines to constant levels of service.  On an uncongested  inter-urban road
(Raverage  sneed  'SR  mph, or LOS =  A), the capacity of a four-lane  road is 4.6 to 5.0 times that
of a two-lane road and over 30 times that of a single-lane  road.  With moderate congestion
(average speed 52 mph, or LOS = C), the ratio falls to 2.7 to 3.5 and 18 to 23 respectively,
and only approaches 2.0 on roads with two or mcre lanes experiencing serious congestion
(average  speed  45 mph, or LOS = E), or on roads with more than four lanes. Since  a relatively
small proportion  of the road network  in most countries will be seriously congested, or exceed
four-lanes (in Tunisia there are no roads over four lanes) (Paterson, 1985), the assumption  that
time costs are homogeneous  of degree zero is too strong.
29.  Finally, assumption mII  assumes that road capacity can be smoothly  adjusted
to traffic. In other words, roads are assumed  to be infinitely  divisible  and are always operating
at their optimal capacity.  This is an important weakness.  Roae investments are inherently
lumpy, at least at the network  level, and although  there is scope fo  increasing  road capacity at
the margin, particularly  in urban areas (Starkie, 1982),  the main increments  in capacity - from
one lane to two and from two to four - can only be added in indivisible  lumps.  This means
that much of the road network  will be operating  well below  :Is  optimal capacity  and congestion14
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Two and 4-lane road, Trnsportaton  Reseach Board, 1985;  single lane roads, Hoban, 1987,  Table 11, figu
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costs  will  be less than  the marginal  costs  of adding  additional  road  capacity.  This  creates  special
pr6uiers  in countries with low traffic  densities. The lumpiness  of investments  means therc .s
little  traffic  congesion  - a common  feature  of the  road  systems  in most  developing  countries  -
and congestion  costs are close to zero.  There are only limited  sections  of road where the
network  is operatng  at capacity,  unless  investment  is sub-optimal  (or  there are physical  and/or
environmental  constraints  restricting  capacity)  which  allows  congestion  to build  up beyond  the
point  where  further  investment  would  be economically  justified.1S
IV.  RELAXING UNACCEPIABLE  ASSUMMONS  AND
'1 I;fL  tl  UIt  I UNIBI
30.  The following section examines what happens to cost recovery when the
unacceptable  limiting assumptions  discussed in section 3 are relaxed.  In each case relaxation
of the assumption  seems to bring in scale economies  which leads to the attendant  deficits when
prices are set equal to marginal  costs.  The section then applies the optimal  pricing model  to a
case study in Tunisia to show, in quantitative  terms, the importance  of these assumptions  for cost
recovery. It is important  to point out, however, that the case study only considers  the classified
road network in Tunisia (17,000 km) and roads in urban agglomerations  (1,800 kmn). The
remaining 14,000 km of unclassified  roads have been omitted (Paterson, 1985).
4.1 Relaxing Unacceptable Assumptions
31.  Let us see how the balanced  budget conclusion  in the optimal pricing model
is affected if  the  unacceptable assumptions are  relaxed.  Specifically, we investigate the
following  cases: (A)  the constant Ko  in the road construction  function  is not zero; (B) there is
a  positive constant M0, denoting fixed maintenance  cost, in the total cost function;12/ (C)
the time cost function V is not homogeneous  of degree zero (in particular, we consider the case
where an additional lane can handle more traffic than the previous lane); and (D)  the road
capacity cannot be smoothiy adjusted to  traffic, so that the network is not in  an optimal
equilibrium  condition.
32.  Consider case (A) and assume that the constant Ko in the road construction
function  is not zero.  If optimal pricing is still adopted, the minimization  conditions  (7) and (8)
still hnled since an  additional  constant in the TC function does not affect any derivative at  11,
and a tax of MECN  is imposed.  Hence ARCN  is still equal to MECN,. Let us refer to the
average road costs of the trip in the previous model and in this relaxed case as ARCN  and
ARC'N  respectively. Then we have  ARC'N =  ARCN  +  r'KJN.  But this implies that:
ARC'.  =  MEC.  +  r*KJN  >  MNr..
..  .,  .
and the total revenue raised by G' and Gd will then be _1  than the road costs borne by the
highway agency.11/
12  It would  be fairly  simple  in the Newbery  model  to include  the routine  maintenance  costs  which  vary with
the volume  of traffic, N, as  well as  D, the number  of heavy axles.
12/  Since  cases A and B involve adding a constant to the objective function  in Newbery's model, the  same
second-order  sufficient  conditions  are  required  to hold.  In case  C. we assume  the existence  of second-order
sufficient  conditions  as  wel.1  16
33.  It is clear that the inclusion  of a constant,  Mo, to denote  the fixed maintenance
cost in the TC function  has the same  effect as the inclusion  of a non-zero  constant Ko  in the TC
function. Therefore, the average external cost of a trip will exceed the marginal external cost
of the trip in case (B) as well.
34.  Next, we consider the case where V is no longer homogeneous  of degree 0,
and additional capacity is better than average capacity.14/  As mentioned earlier, capacity
in this model  is indirectly  presented:  it is not given by the volume of traffic, but is given by the
saving  in time-cost  when capacity is increased. Hence, the additional  capacity  is represented  by
-VN units of cost saved (recall that as w increases, users time-cost decreases and V,  is
negative).  Given that there are w units of capacity and the total volume of traffic is N, the
average  volume of traffic per unit of capacity is N/w.  The marginal  impact on time-cost  of an
additional  trip is VN, or, to put it differently, one less trip saves VN units of time-cost. Hence
N/w less trips saves a total of (N/w) VN  units of cost.  Since adding  an existing  unit of capacity
is equivalent to having N/w less traffic, the average capacity is given by the total cost saved:
(N/w) VN.
35.  In case (C), since  additional  capacity  is better than  existing  capacity, we have:
N.  >  (N/w)'VN.
As  before, relaxing  the homogeneity  assumption  of V does not affect  the minimization  conditions
(7) and (8) and the marginal  external  cost of the traffic,  MECN, is still given by (10). However,
in this case, as in the above two cases, the average road cost per trip exceeds the marginal
external cost of a trip:
ARC, =  (r-'wK +  w M)/N  =  E-MD/,*  - w*V.r  by (7)
>  E.MD/, + N*VN
= MECN.  by (10).
Again, the cost recovery proposition  is lost and the total revenue raised by GI and Gd  will be
IX  than the road costs borne by the highway  agency.
36.  Case D is not really an assumption,  but follows as a consequence  of using
differential  calculus.  The analysis is all done in terms of a single km of road - carrying a
constant flow of traffic - which can be smoothly  adjusted to traffic, i.e. the number of lanes
can be smoothly  adjusted  to ensure that the costs of congestion  are just equal to the costs of
adding a marginal increment in road capacity. The one km section of road is then generalized
IN  Mathematically,  we assume  that  V is homogeneous  of a negative  degree.  The  current  paragraph  prsents
the  intuition  to explaLn  why  this  should  be the  case. By  Euler's  equation,  if V(w,N)  is homogeneous  of 0
degree  k  <  O, w-.  + N-VN  = k  < O.  Thisisthe first  inequality  in the next  pargraph.17
and applied to the road network as a  whole.  This formulation  cannot handle spatial and
temporal  variations  in traffic, changes  in travel  demand  and the obvious  indivisibilities  associated
with expanding  capacity.  Since these factors are not assumptions,  but follow from the nature
of the mathematics, they cannot be relaxed.  Furthermore, since indivisibilities  are generally
recognized  to be a source of scale economies,  they automatically  cause deficits when prices are
set equal to marginal  costs.
4.2  The Case of Tunisia
37.  The impact of the above assumptions  are illustrated in Table 2.  The table
shows that actual expenditures  on highways in Tunisia amounted to $91.62 million in  1982,
including the shortfall of regular routine maintenance  and financing charges.  This does not,
however, necessarily  represent the economically  efficient costs of delivering road services (i.e.
these costs may be inflated  by allocative  inefficiencies  on the input side). This will not be dealt
with in the present  paper, even  though  it is known  that  production  inefficiencies  can be important
for pricing and cost recovery policies (Kranton, 1990).  Instead, the paper will focus on the
pricing of road services to optimize  allocative  efficiency  on the demand side.
38.  Table 2  shows several discrepancies between the costs incurred and the
revenues  generated  by optimal  pricing.  The variable  costs of resurfacing  (item (iv), column  2),
are less than half the costs actually incurred on road maintenance  (item (v), column 1), even
when the shortfall of routine maintenance  (item (iii), column 1) is excluded. When capital  and
financing costs are included, the optimum pricing model only covers just over half the total
costs.  User charges set on the basis of the above optimal  pricing model will therefore leave a
large block of expenditures  unfunded.18
Table 2.  Actual Costs and Those Covered by Optimal Pricing Model:  Tunisia 1982
(Dollar Million at 1982 Prices)
AcAl  Revs  Generated
Costs  by Opdmal
tens  Incurred  Pricing Model
(I)  /2)
Recurrent Expenditures:
(i)  Administration  2.44
(ii)  Routine  Maintenance  22.48
(iii)  Shortfall  of Routine
Maintenance  (a)  '.62
(iv)  Resurfacing:
fixed (b)  5.17
variable  20.68  20.68
(v)  Sub-Total  56.39  20.68
CaDital  Exoenditures: (c)
(vi)  Extension/Improvement  9.80
(vii)  Expansion  of Capacity  19.60
(viii)  Annualized  Construction  Cost (d)
non-urban  roads  13.68
urban  roads  20.00
(ix)  Fixed Resurfacing  Cost (e)
non-urban  roads  0.20
urban roads  0.30
Financin2 Char2es: (f)
(x)  Debt Service/Repayment  5.83  _
Sub-Total  35.23  34.18
Grand Total  91.62  54.86
Unfunded  Road Expenditure  - 36.76
Notes:
(a) Since road conditions  were generally deteriorating,  it is estimated that allocations for
routine  maintenance  were about  20 percent  lower  than needed  to maintain  the road  network
in a svaia iong-tenn condiiion.
(b) The.  reesent  weather related resurfacing  costs which are unrelated to traffic. They
comprise  about 20 percent of total resurfacing  costs in "dry non-freeze"  countries like
Tunisia.
(c) Assuming  onethird of capital  expenditures  are new construction  and the remainder  are to
expand capacity. Real capital  expenditure  between 1976 and 1982 was fairly stable and
fluctuated  within  about 20 percent of the mean  expenditure  for the period.
(d) See Annex 1 for derivation  of these figures.
(e) The additional fixed resurfacing costs associated with expanding capacity. They are
calculated  as 1.5 percent of initial costs.
(f)  This it  refers to World Bank loans only. It appears elsewhero  in the government's
accoun.  i and  is  usually omitted from  financial statements of  road  revenues and
expendiLures.
Source.  World Bank, 1987 (b); Newbery  et al, Table 21, 1988.19
V.  FINANCING  REMAING  EXPENDITURES
39.  Figures 2 and 3 showed that there are substantial  economies  of scale in road
construction  and in road use.  Road maintenance  costs also contain a number  of important  fixed
costs.  Furthermore, since roads cannot be smoothly  adjusted to traffic, marginal costs for the
entire road network will be significantly  lower than average  costs, unless  capacity is artificially
constrained by environmental  or other constraints.  User charges based on the above optimal
pricing model will therefore result in substantial  financial deficits.  This was shown in the
Tunisian example presented in Table 2.  The question which then arises is, how should this
deficit be financed? The only feasible  options on a network basis are by raising revenues from
users, raising additional  general tax revenues, or by taxing beneficiaries. Taxing beneficiaries,
i.e. imposing  taxes on the property which  benefits from provision of roads, are only suitable  for
roads which primarily  provide access to property like residential  streets and rural access roads.
For other roads - those which primarily  provide services  to traffic  - the alternatives  are user
charges or general tax revenues. This paper concentrates  on these roads and does not examine
the option of  taxing beneficiaries.lJ/  The other option - cutting back expenditures on
maintenance and investment to  reduce the deficit - is  not economically  efficient, since it
increases user costs more than it reduces road expenditures  (Harral and Faiz, 1988).
40.  The economic  consequences  of the above choices can be examined  in termns  of
Figure 4.  In this figure, demand for travel is shown  by D, while costs - including VOCs and
marginal  external road costs - are shown by ASC and MSC.  Under average cost pricing, the
volume of travel is N at price P.  Likewise, under marginal cost pricing, the volume of travel
would be N' at price P'.  The move from point A, where roads are priced at average costs, to
point B, where they are priced at marginal costs, leads to a net increase in total surplus equal
to the area of triangle ABC.  However, the move from A to B also results in a deficit equal to
the area of EBP'F. The  welfare  comparison  is thus between  the welfare  gain, ABC, attributable
to the move  from average to marginal  cost pricing, less the welfare  costs of the taxation  required
to finance  the deficit. Let m denote the costs of taxation  (deadweight  and administrative  costs)
expressed as a constant  percentage  of the tax revenues.  Then it immediately  follows that the
welfare  costs of financing  the required  deficit is just mnEBP'F. Provided the administrative
costs of mobilizing  these tax revenues  are similar to those associated with road taxationj!,
the benefits of marginal  cost pricing will exceed the costs only if mnEBP'F <  ABC, or m  <
ABC/EBP'F.
II/  The alernave  of fnancing  the deficits  through  domestic  and/or  intnational  borrowing,  merely  defers payment,  since
the loas  still  need to be serviced  and repaid.
If/  The  administraive  costa  should  be similar, since  many of the tax instruments  - import  duties, sales and  excise  taxes
- are used to collect  both road user taxes  and general  revenues.20
41.  Since the non-marginal  costs (the difference  between MSC and ASC) are fixed,
the rectangle  EBP'F, EB.N', is also equal to AC.N.  The above inequality  can thus be written
as
m  <  (1/2) AC*(N'-N)/(AC*N)
or  m  <  (  O2)(N'-N)/N
or  m  <  (1/2)AN/N
where A denotes a finite charge:  AN =  (N'-N), AP =  (P-P').  Since the point elasticity  e
evaluated  at point A is defined to be (AN/N)/(AP/P),  it follows that:
m  <  - (1/2)e AP/P
The right-hand side of  this inequality has been plotted in  Figure 5  as a  function of  the
proportional fall in price, AP/P, given the all-day price elasticities  of demand for automobiles
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Figure 4:  Effect of Marginal  and Averagc  Cost Pricing on Total  Surplus21
42.  Figure 5 can now be used to examine  whether  in Tunisia  it is more economically
efficient to mobilize  the required revenues from road users, or by raising additional  general tax
0.10 
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Figure  5:  Threshold Value of the Marginal Cost of Public Funds as a Function of the Proportional Fall in
Price, Given Different Elasticities of Demand.
revenues.  Recall that the unfunded road expenditures  shown in Table 2 amount to about $37
million (costs of about $92 million, less revenues from optimal user charges of about $55
million). The marginal  external  costs of road use per veh km (for each class of vehicle)  are set
out in Table 3, column 15.  If user charges  are set equal to these marginal external costs, they
will generate  total revenues of about $55 million. Column 17 shows the size of the ad valorem
mark-up over the marginal external costs of car use (optimal  user charges, plus VOCs) needed
to generate the required additional  $37 million  to cover the unfunded  road expenditures  shown
in Table 2.  It does so by charging average  costs, i.e., by raising the marginal costs of car use
(shown in column 16) by the amounts shown in column 17.  The average mark-up comes toT  $.  °eY_Id  Unr Charges ad  Ad Valoem Mak-UP  Nedd  t. Cover Unfwided Road  Expeadiluu:  TmWa,  I*
(cIweb  k-  sd  $ maUllk)
Vehclie  _aaeSsgh  Us4c of Road  Ndtwok  Optima  Uscr asaig  (a veh km)  Oplimd  Ad Vs hM
_______  ______  ______  ______  Usci  M aD  ksp
VOCs  IcEs  Vh  to  (amI)  PCE km (mill)  ESA  Road  Coegion  Coo  aCaug-  Ocr
cc_Nic  'km  Damagc  *  VOCr  C*a
Veb  Type  (IAM)  I-U  UAaa  a"  I-U  Ua6m  Tod  l-U  Usban  TOal  (mill)  Cao  I-U  Uslm  TOlW  (ceth  km)  (evM  b  bo
(I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (I1)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (ls)  (16)  ( 7)
Car  aso)la  8.79  2.00  R.0  0.0001  1404  330  2284  1,404  880  2.264  0.2  0.00  0.16  0.23  0.39  9.18  0.26  t4
CarDbeci  6.44  1.00  1.00  0.0002  464  292  755  464  291  755  0.2  0.00  0.16  0.23  0.39  6.83  0.20  t4
UWily Vedicl  12.44  1.00  2.00  o.o0  1721  851  2572  1.721  851  2.572  20.6  0 o1  0.6  0.23  0.40  12.84  0.37
Li&  TMs  30.37  1.50  1.50  0.092D  442  218  659  662  32  989  60.6  0.09  0.25  0.34  0.63  31.05  o.89
Med_um Truck  32.3  1.70  2.00  0.5800  161  16  177  274  32  306  102.7  0.59  0.29  0.45  1.32  33.69  0.97
Hwy Sigb  Truck  39.23  2.00  2.50  2.6M0  204  20  224  408  50  458  582.4  2.65  0.33  0.56  3.55  42.68  1.23
Hvy Taad.Truck  39.13  2.00  3.00  S.80o0  12  1  13  24  3  27  69.9  5.49  0.33  063  6.50  45.63  1.31
Alcule  Tmwk  7S.78  2.00  3.00  6.8000  233  7  240  266  21  287  952.0  6.94  0.33  0.68  7.94  83.72  2.41
Ba  62.38  2.00  3.00  0.4900  125  63  I8n  250  189  439  92.1  0.50  0.33  068  2 5.  63.89  1.84
Special Vehiclk  62.38  1.50  1.50  0.4900  220  78  298  330  117  447  146.0  0.50  0.25  0.34  1.08  63.46  1.U3
ToWed  4885  2425  7310  5.802  2761  8,563  2026.6
Total User CostltRevcnuea  20 68  13.88  20.30  54.66  36.76
Notes:  Heavy  sk-axe-xe  have  the  v  me VOC  as bcavy  adm-aie  It:t  a-s special  vcices  have  he same  VOCcsa buses.
Source:  (Ncwbesy. ct a*, 19U)23
about 2.9 percent and the final user charge would then consist of column 15 plus column 17.
When the percentage mark-up, 2.9 percent, is applied to Figure 5,  it intersects the highest
relevant elasticity  curves at points A (truck), B (car) and C (bus) resulting in threshold  values
of m, representing  the costs of mobilizing  additional  general tax revenues,  of 1.3, 1.6, and 1.9
percent respectively. In other words, if the value of m is less than 1.9 percent it will be more
economically  efficient to raise the required revenues through general taxation; while if it is
greater than 1.9 percent, it is better to do so by collecting the required revenues from road
users.  Even if the percentage  mark-up  increases  to 10 percent, the value of m still has to be less
than 6.5 percent before it is more economically  efficient to raise the required revenues through
general taxation.
43.  Recent work has shown, however, that the deadweight  losses caused by general
taxatic.n  are high.  Using a general equilibrium  model, it has been shown that the welfare loss
from a one percent increase  in all existing (distortionary)  tax rates in the USA is between 17 and
56 cents per dollar of extra revenues raised (Ballard  et al, 1985). Other  estimates for the USA
(Browning, 1986), Canada and Sweden are similar, while in the UK a more limited partial
equilibrium  approach suggests  that the economic  costs of raising  public  revenues lie in the range
11  percent to 21 percent for local property  and income  taxes  respectively  (Dodgson  and Topham,
1987). In developing  countries  like  Tunisia, with narrow tax bases and weak tax administration,
the costs of mobilizing  additional  tax revenues  are likely to be even higher.  This means that  m
is likely to be well above 2.9 percent in Tunisia  and is also likely  to be above this figure in other
developing  countries.
44.  The above analysis  has shown that, provided  the administrative  costs of road user
taxes are similar  to general revenue taxes, the welfare  costs of marginal  cost pricing  plus general
taxation  are likely to be higher than the welfare costs of average  cost pricing in most developing
countries.  It follows that a pricing system which uses optimal departures from marginal cost
pricing to finance the deficit EBP'F (where some services may be priced below average costs
and others above it) will be even more attractive in welfare terms.  This leads to the overall
conclusion  that, given the generally high costs of general taxation, welfare will nearly always
be greater if the financial deficits associated with marginal cost pricing are  financed using
optimal mark-ups  over marginal costs.24
VI.  EFFICIENT COST RECOVERY
45.  The above analysis  has established  two important  conclusions. First, if the user
charges for an entire road  network are  based on  short-run marginal costs (variable road
maintenance costs, plus the costs of  traffic congestion), they will nearly always generate
insufficient  revenues to cover total costs.  This has been demonstrated  for Tunisia  - and will
generally hold for all  road networks with low traffic densities  - unless road capacity is
artificially constrained and congestion is allowed to  increase well beyond the point where
benefit/cost  criteria would recommend  expanding  capacity to reduce congestion. Second, the
high costs of mobilizing  public  revenues, suggests  that the additional  revenues  needed  to balance
the road budget should be collected from road users, preferably  by using an optimal mark-up
over marginal costs.  These conclusions also raise three further questions: (i) while it is
generally  accepted  that marginal  costs should  be regarded  as the floor below which user charges
should  never fall, is it necessary  to stop at short-run  marginal costs when a significant  number
of the remaining  costs are avoidable,  but not necessarily  marginal?  (ii) how does one calculate
the optimal  departures from marginal  costs needed to finance the unfunded  road expenditures?
and (iii) is road congestion  pervasive and is it feasible  to charge for it.
6.1  Variable and Common Costs
46.  All the costs in Table 2, column 1, other than the financing  costs, are - at least
in principle - avoidable.  17/  They are not all marginal,  but can be avoided  over a reasonable
period of time. Indeed, there are three broad levels of avoidability,  costs which:  (i) are variable
and are incurred on behalf of identifiable  users (these are the variable costs of the road agency
and include the luad damage costs from the optimum pricing model): (ii) can be avoided over
a short period of time and are incurred as common  costs on behalf of an identifiable  group of
users, but not of individual  members  of the group (e.g. heavy vehicles);  and (iii) are avoidable,
but are common  to all users (they can only be avoided by closing  the entire road network). In
practice, road  users cannot be excluded from using the  road  network.  TIh.e  concept of
avoidability  nevertheless  provides  a pragmatic  way of attributing  ex post expenditures  to specific
user groups. In the rest of this paper these three groups of costs will be referred to as variable
costs, grouped common  costs and collective  common  costs.
47.  Table 4 has divided the costs set out in Table 2, column 1, into these three
categories and shows that they comprise 29, 26 and 45 percent respectively of total road
expenditures  in Tunisia.  The first category, column 1, are caused by the passage of vehicles
17!  The financing costs can only be avoided by defaulting,  or rescheduling the loans.25
over the road pavement (variable administrative  and routine maintenance  costs) and by the
passage of heavy axles (variable  resurfacing  costs).  Being marginal, such costs should clearly
be recovered from users: uie former  in terms of veh km (since  there is no other straight-forward
way of attributing them to users), the latter according to ESA km (to reflect the damage done
to the road pavement  by the passage of heavy axles).
Table 4.  Analysis of Costs in Tarn  of Thdr  Avoidability: Tunisia,  1982 (a)
(Dollar, milGlon)
Common  to Specufc
Immediately  Groups  of Users  Common  Total
Avoidable  to all  User
Item  Costs  Heavy  Urban  Rural  Users  Costs
(Marginal)  Vehicles  Roads  Roads  (Fixed)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Administration (b)  0.49  - - - 1.95  2.44
Routine Maintenance (c)  5.62  2.81  - 19.68  28.11
Resurfacing (d)  20.68  - - - 5.17  2S.85
Extensions/lmprovements (e)  - 4.42  5.55  11.10  8.33  29.40
Financing Charges (f  - - - - 5.83  5.83
Total  26.79  7.23  5.55  11.10  40.96  91.63
Percent of Grand Total  29.20  26.10  - 44.70  100.0
Notes:  (a)  lduding  shortfal  of regular road maintenance.
(b) Fixed cost  include ai  expenditures on buDdings  and 70 percent of salaries.
(c)  70 percet  of these costs are fimed  and 10 percent are attributable to heavy vehicles.
(d)  In  dry  non-freeme  conditions,  20  percent  of  resurfacing costs  are  attributable  to
esfronmental factors.
(e)  Assuming  one-third is new  construction and the remainder is to expand capacity (of tbis,
one4lUr@  i  in urban areas and two-thirds in rural areas) and that 15 percent of these
cost  are incurred to ensure roads are strong enougb to carry heavy vehicles.
(fM  These  costs  can only be avoided by defaulting, or cancelling the loans.26
48.  There are two possible  ways of dealing with the second category  of costs. The
first is to simply  treat them in the same way as collective  common  costs and charge them against
all users.  This has some attractions on grounds of simplicity  and economic  efficiency.  The
second way is to charge them against each group of common  users.  This is more equitable  and
may hence be more politically  acceptable. Each of the grouped common  costs can, at least in
principle, be avoided by  withdrawing service from that specific user group: either heavy
vehicles, urban road users, or rural road users.  To justify scoving  them, each group should  be
willing  to pay for the costs they incur: heavy vehicle; again in terms of ESA km and urban  and
rural road users in terms of passenger  car equivalent  (PCE)  kilometers  (which  measures  the road
space they occupy).l8/  Finally, the collective common costs should be recovered from all
users in a way which minimizes  loss of consumer  surplus.
6.2  Recovering Collective Coumnon Costs
49.  The collective  common  costs shown  in Table  4, column 5, are incurred on behalf
of several groups of common  users and the aim is to define a mark-up over base costs (VOCs
and variable and grouped common  costs) which: (i) generates sufficient  revenues to cover all
collective  common  costs; while (ii) minimizing  the consequent  loss of consumer surplus.  This
is similar  to the classical  tax problem in which  the overall excess  burden of the tax is minimized
by equalizing  the marginal excess burden of the last dollar of tax revenues raised from each
commodity  (Ramsey, 1927;  Rosen, 1988). In the case of roads, this translates  into minimizing
the relative  loss of consumer  surplus  per dollar of collective  common  costs covered  by each user
group.  This is illustrated in Figure 6.  In this figure D represents the compensated  demand
curve for one particular type of traffic. The curve BC refers to base costs and represents  VOCs
and the variable and grouped  common  costs set out in Table 4, columns (1) to (4). Without  any
mark-up, demand would be in equilibrium  at point B, with output N at price P.  The amount
T*P 1, the ad valorem mark-up over the base costs, represents the contribution (per veh km)
which  this type  of traffic makes  towards  covering  collective  common  costs. The deadweight  loss
per dollar of revenue raised through the increased user charge, S, is equal to the triangular
deadweight  loss area ABC divided by the contribution  to collective common  costs, P"CAP'.
In other words:
S  =  1/2*AC*(N-N')/AC'N'
=  1/2-AN/N'
where AN  =  (N-N').
18/  PCEs measure  the impact  which vehicles  have on the speed, and  hen:e the cost, of other vehicles. They  vary by
type of road. terrain  and  condition  of traffic.27
P--Markup  to  cover  coilectrve
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FE  6:  Loss of Consumer  Surplus  Associated  with Covering  Collective  Conmmon  Costs
50.  The own-price elasticity of demand at point A, e, is equal to (AN/N')-(P'/hP)
and the elasticity of  supply at point  A is equal  to  (AN/N') (P'/AP'),  where  AN  =  (N-N'),
AP  =  (P'-P)  and  AP'  =  (P"-P).  Provided  the  cross-pnicp  elasticities  of  demarnd  eee  n  the
different  user  groups  are  relatively  small,  they  can  be  ignored.19/  Likewise,  since  the
proportion  of  the  budget  allocated  for  spending  on  roads  is  small,  the  uncompensated  demand
elasticitites  (Annex  2)  can  be  taken  as  a  reasonable  approximation  of  the  compensated  demand
elasticities.  The  price  elasticities  of  demand  and  supply,  and  the  ad  valorem  mark-up,  can  then
be  used  to  calculate  the  deadweight  loss,  S,  as  follows:
li/e  =  N'AP/ANP',  ;  1/s  =  N'AP'/ANP"
1/g  =  li/e  - l/s  =  N'/AN  (APP  -AP'  P')/(P'P")
19/  They  are effectively  zero for passenger  versu  freight  trnsipost, au  low for public  transport  versus  car (Baum  and
Kcntner,  p.  19, 1980)  and even  lower for car versus  public transport. They  are more significant  when there are
competing  public transport modes (e.g.,  mini-bus  versus bus).  In such cases the price elasticity needs to be
adjusted  by subtracting  the relevant  cross-price  elasticity  (Taplin  and Waters, 1985).28
Substituting  for AP and AP' and simplifying:
1/g  =  (N'/AP)-P(P'-P")/(P'P")
or  1/g  =  (N'/AN) P'TP'/P'  P" =  (N'/AN)'TP/P`
or  AN/N'  =  g-TP/P"
where T, the ad  valorem mark-up =  (P'-P")/P'.
Substituting  this in the expression for the area S gives:
S =  -1/2 g TP/P"
51.  Since there are several types  of traffic, the overall loss of welfare  is minimized
by equalizing  S across all user groups:
S  =  g,T1P1/P2" =  g2T2P2/P2 "  .*X =  g.T,P./Pn"
This is the so-called  inverse  elasticity  rule (the term g being the inverse elasticity). The process
of equalizing S across the different user groups is illustrated in Figure 7.  With a constant
elasticity demand curve, the lines representing  car, bus and truck are straight lines; otherwise
they are curves.
52.  The revenue  generated  by the above mark-ups  is calculated  by multiplying  each
mark-up  by the appropriate  values of P' and N', corresponding  to that particular type of traffic.
In other words:
Revenue  =  T,P',N',  +  T2P'2N'2 +  ...  +  TnP' 3N'.n
The appropriate  value of S needed  to generate  the revenues  required to cover common  costs, can
either be solved  by trial-and-error,  or by plotting  a graph of total revenue as a function  of S and
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Figwre  7:  Using the lnverse Elasticity  Rule to Compute  the Mark-ups  Needed  to Cover Collective  Common  Costs30
6.3  Is it Feasible to Charee for Congestion?
53.  The optimum  pricing model  charges road users for the external  congestion  costs
they impose on other road users.  It is worth noting that the avoidable  cost methodology
outlined in previous sections also charges road users for some of the congestion they incur.
Expenditures on expanding capacity (Table 2,  column 1, item (vii)), which amounted to an
estimated $19.60 million  in 1982, are charged to road users as an avoidable  cost on the basis
of the road space they occupy (measured  in terms of PCE km).  These congestion  charges  are
nevertheless  too low (i.e., the costs currently  charged to them, $19.60 million, are less than the
$34.18 million [the sum of items (viii) and (ix) in Table 2, column 2] implied  by the optimum
pricing model).  Furthermore, since motorists  are only aware of the private costs they incur
when making a journey, it would  be more economically  efficient to levy an explicit congestion
charge to ensure they consciously  paid for the entire social costs their journey imposed on
others.  It is also essential, on both distributional  and economic  efficiency  grounds, to charge
congestion  against the specific  road users who cause it, rather than to average it over the entire
road network and over all users.  This is particularly relevant with regard to the distinction
between urban and rural road users.  Most road congestion  occurs in urban areas and averaged
congestion  charges will generally  charge urban road users far too little and rural road users far
too  much.20/  Finally,  when there  are  physical and/or  environmental constraints which
prevent road capacity being expanded  --  even though such expansion may be economically
justified - it will usually be desirable to use an explicit charging mechanism  to help ration
scarce road space.
54.  However, although there is a strong case for introducing explicit congestion
charges, the literature makes little attempt to identify: (i) the causes of road congestion (and
hence tne efficacy of road pricing); (ii) the extent of congestion (i.e., is it pervasive, or only
confined to selected cities in some countries); and (iii) whether it is feasible  and cost-effective
to charge for congestion (see for example, Churchill, 1972; Newbery, et al,  1985; Walters,
1968). Low speeds  in urban areas are only partly attributable  to the presence  of other vehicles.
In  most cities in  developing countries, vehicle speeds are  significantly influenced by  the
wlsfl;guraduon1  and state of the road network, the preseice  f  olii  .i  u-afi&ic  wdestriials,  liand-
carts, head-loading, cycles, three-wheelers,  etc.), parked vehicles and encroaching  road-side
activities. Under these circumstances,  road pricing wili have less effect  on vehicle speeds  than,
2QI  In Tunisia,  congeaion costs were  aveaged over the enie  road  network  and then  added  to the  d  user charge.
Thi resulted  in urban  peak-period  car uwe  paying l1s than one-eighth  of tde  congcsion  cost  they imposed  on
other motorists,  while rural  car  users (cecounting  for over 60 percent  of car  ve  kmn),  paid neely ten times thewe
cost (Newbery,  et aI, 1988,  Tables  3  nd  7). It is not inmWively  obvious  that  such  gross avenging, even wben
appropritely weighted  (Heady, 1989, Appendix  Model  4), improves  economic  efficiency.31
say, implementing a broad package of measures including traffic management, minor road
improvements  and traffic restraint.
55.  It  is likewise doubtful whether road congestion - in the sense of vehicles
interfering with other vehicles  - -s a universal phenomenon. Work currently underway  at the
World Bank has identified two main types of city.  The first are those where road congestion
could be virtually eliminated by introducing simple traffic management  measures (improved
maintenance, road-signing and enforced traffic regulations) and minor road improvements
(junction improvements, stopping and parking bays and relief roads).  In other words, the
congestion  in these cities is mainly self-inflicted  and attributable  to the poor performance  of the
road agency.  Most cities in developing countries fall into this category.  In these cities,
combined  traffic management  and minor road improvements  are the most cost-effective  ways of
dealing with road congestion. Second, there are a limited number of cities in the Bank's main
borrowing  countries  where road congestion  is so serious  that traffic management  and minor road
improvements  need to be supplemented  by explicit measures  of traffic restraint.  In general
terms, there are only two cities in Africa which currently fall into this category  (Lagos and, to
a more limited extent, Nairobi), five in Asia (Bangkok,  Bombay, Jakarta, Manila and Seoul),
six in Latin America (Buenos Aires, Bogota, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and
Santiago)  and five in the World Bank's Europe, Middle  East and North African  region (Algiers,
Budapest,  Cairo, Istambul, and Tunis).  Serious congestion,  requiring explicit traffic restraint
measures, is therefore limited to a relatively small number  of developing  countries.
56.  Charging for road congestion in developing countries is also quite difficult.
There are clearly socio-political  difficulties. This explains why Singapore  (World  Bank, 1986,
Box 1) is the only city with a scheme in operation, although  Hong Kong has experimented  with
one and Stockholm in Sweden is in  the final stages of planning to introduce one in  1991
(designed  to reduce both congestion and pollution). There are also implementation  difficulties
related to the characteristics  of the road network.  It is fairly easy to devise ways of charging
vehicles travelling to and from the city centers in Bombay  and Lagos (in both cases, vehicles
must use one of three arterial corridors for part of their journey).  On the other hand, it is
considerably  more difficult  to devise ways  of doing  so in cities  like Jakarta, Manila  and Bangkok
which  are more  spread  out and experience local congestion  in several locations.
57.  Finally, congestion charging is relatively expensive and can be difficult to
administer. The simplest method is to establish a cordon and to charge vehicles  as they cross
it.  T'his  could be done in cities like Bombay  and Lagos where the layout of the city lends itself
to such treatment.  A cordon, or toll ring, is nevertheless  relatively expensive.  The cost of
implementing  the proposed toll ring in Oslo is estimated  at $40 million, with annual operating
and maintenance  costs of $17 million. The area licencing  scheme in Singapore  is much simpler
and less expensive. Vehicles  must display  a license in the restricted zone (there is no need for
toll booths), but this makes it more difficult to administer. Even in a well-disciplined  society
liMe  Singapore the cost of administering  and enforcing the Singapore scheme are nearly $1.632
million  per year.  This represents a substantial  investment at the city level in a developing
country.
58.  The other alternative, electronic road pricing (ERP), is  relatively easy  to
administer,  but is also expensive  to install  and difficult to maintain. Initial installation  costs for
an electronic number plate system in Hong Kong were estimated as $31 million for 210,000
vehicles  with an annual  operating  cost of $2.6 million. In Cambridge,  U.K., where a smart-card
system  has been  proposed, the estimated  costs of installation  are roughly  $50 million  for 250,000
vehicles with an annual operating cost of  $10 million to cover enforcement, servicing of
equipment and  installation of  metering devices on  annual additions to  the  vehicle fleet.
Maintenance  in developing  countries is also a problem and, since the electronic number plate
system debits the car owner's bank account, the rudimentary  nature of personal banking in
developing  countries poses further difficulties.
59.  An added complication  is that congestion charges can also weaken financial
discipline.  The amount of congestion is a  function of  both road traffic and the physical
configuration  of the road network and the way it is managed. It follows that there are a variety
of potential interventions  - the improved traffic management  and minor road improvemesits
referred to in para. 55 - which can go some distance towards lowering  congestion costs.
Conversely,  there are a number  of current interventions  which, if not actively  administered  (e.g.,
repair of traffic lights, enforcing traffic regulations, controlling road-side  land use, etc.), will
result in  more congestion than necessary.  The amount of  congestion is  not determined
exogenously;  it is partly determined  by the performance  of the road agency.  It follows  that, if
the revenue from congestion  charges  accrues to the road agency, it will have little incentive  -
other than possible  public  indignation  - to actively intervene  to reduce  congestion. Congestion
charges should therefore  be administered  as a pure tax and collected  by the government  (which
also has little incentive  to intervene, since  intervention  would  reduce government  tax revenues).
60.  The  overall  conclusions are  therefore  that:  (i)  serious  road  congestion,
warranting explicit interventions  to restrain traffic in the interests of economic efficiency, is
fairly limited in developing  countries; (ii) where there is serious  congestion, it makes sense to
introduce  congestion  charges  to ration scarce  road space;  (iii) methods  of charging  for congestion
are limited;  and (iv) tde charging  instrument  selected  will depend  on the nature of the city and
its road network, the administrative  complexity of  the charging  method, its maintenance
requirements  and its affordability. Simple  cordon pricing schemes  are likely to be the preferred
solution in cities like Bombay 4nd Lagos, while electronic methods would be relatively more
appropriate in cities like Bangkok, Mexico City and Seoul.  Furthermore, to the extent that
congestion  caused by motor vehicles  is limited  in developing  countries  vis-'a-vis the developed
world, congestion  charges will make little contribution  to the fixed costs of the road network  in
most countries and only a  small contribution in  those countries expcriencing serious road
congestion.33
VII.  APPLYING  THE  PRICING  MODEL
61.  The above avoidable  cost methodology,  together with the inverse elasticity  rule,
can now be used to calculate  a set of road user charges for Tunisia. The price elasticities  have
been taken from Annex  2 and are equal to -0.6, -0.7 and -0.  for car, bus and truck respectively
(the  figure for  truck being the  mid-point between -0.9,  representing strong integ-modal
competition,  and -0.1, representing  no inter-modal  competition). The supply  elasticities have
been estimated from the slope of BC in Figure 6; the values for car, bus and truck are 46.61,
34.82 and 13.21 respectively. In other words, BC is fairly elastic. The calculations  are set out
in Table 5 which shows, in column 21, the resulting user charges and, in column 22, the
revenues which would result from levying such charges.2I/  The total revenues generated by
the user charges, $91 million (which appear in Table 5 as $91.8 million due to rounding),
correspond  to the total expenditures  set out in Table 2.  The user charges  vary from 0.52 cents
per veh km for cars (gasoline)  to 2.71 cents per veh km for buses and 12.70 cents per veh km
for articulated  trucks.
62.  Table 6 compares the results frcm the avoidable cost methodology with the
existing user charges in Tunisia (shown in column 7).  It does not include the user charges
recommended  by Newbery, et al (1988), since the over-estimation  of congestion costs would
have caused these charges to generate $285.0 million, tather than the more modest figure of
$54.86 given in Table 2, column (2).  Table 6 includes three comparisons. The first set of user
charges (column 1) correspond to the ones derived in Table 5 and are designed to cover all
avoidable  costs by generating  total revenues  of $91.6 million. The next two sets were designed
to generate $385.7 million, these being the revenues generated by current user charges.22/
The first of these sets, column 3, has been calculated or, the same basis as those set out in
column 1.  In other words, the difference between the $91.6 million generated by the user
charges set out in column (1) and the $385.7 million  generated  by those set out in column (7),
has been treated as a collective  common cost and recovered from all users using the inverse
elasticity  rule.  The second set, column (5), has treated  the difference  between  the $91.6 million
and the $386.7 million as a pure tax and, following the procedure adopted by Newbery, et al
(1988), has recovered  these  additional  collective  common  costs from passenger  vehicles  only (the
user charges for vehicle types 3 to 6 and 8 have been kept the same as in column (1)).
2j/  Table S ha been laid  out as X Lotus  spread-sheet. The inverse  elasticity  rule is applied  by choosing  a coll well away
from the table, say AS35, to represent  S.  This cell is then set equal  to the initial guessed  value  of S.  The ceUs  in
column 19 are sat equal to (AS3S/g), with  8  representing  the appropriate  price and supply  elasticities  for that type
of traffic.  Column  20 is then set  equal to (col. 19 col. 18). The value  of AS3S  is then altered iteratively  until the
total of column 22 equals  the total revenues  required.
fI  The govemrnment  in Tunisia collected about S200 million in road user charges during 1982 (World Ba.k and
Intenational Road Federation  statistics). The higher  figures  of $285  miUion  and $386 milion given in Newbery  et
al (1988),  sugget  (i) the VOC model  used in Tunisia  contains  some  bias;  end/or  (ii) there  were imporant  exemptions
(e.g. of diplomatic  and  government  vehicles);  and/or (iii) the collection  of road user charges  was subject  to significant
levels of avoidance,  evasion  and lealage.TaM. S.  Calcm,atim  or  ltr  Cdxe  c  Us-,  Avoidable  Cod Priatipk ma t  lvcrsc  Elicity  Rauk: Taia.  192
(ctvh  im  ad  S Mibi)
VdMeis  charalgka  Uqe  of Road  Mctwark  Avokiable ad Cimm  Code  (ct*rA km)
TOWl
us"t
FIM  Veb km (mii)  P  CE mu (mill)  Vadabkl  Cod  omqcdCmo.  S-Tow  camisa Codn  GRAND  Omc
VOCa.  BSA  TOTAL  Ruc
km  Al  Hq  Hvy  U  c  *  u  8
Vhice  Type  (ckm)  F-U  Uha  MSA  1-U  Utts  Tdal  I-U  Uiba  T4a  (mill)  vbts  vebs  vdaa  I-U  U  Cage  VOCa  (S)  (Ct  S  )
(I)  (  (3)  (4)  (s)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (t1)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (  (21)  (2
Cu choIic  8.79  1.0O  1.00  0.0001  1404  8o  2284  1404  880  2284  0.2  0.08  0.00  0.00  0(17  0.13  0.28  9.07  0.03  0 24  0.52  11.8
CarDiced  6.44  1.00  1.00  0.0001  464  291  75s  464  291  755  0.1  0.08  O.O  0.00  0.07  0.13  0.28  6.72  0.03  0.18  046  3.4
Ulility  12  44  1.00  1.00  0.000D  1721  851  2572  1721  851  2572  20.6  0.08  0.01  0.00  0.07  0.13  0.29  12.73  0.03  0.39  0.68  17.5
LI1aTnek  30.37  L.so  1.50  0.09m0  441  218  659  662  327  989  60.6  0.08  0.09  0.03  0.10  0.19  0.53  30.85  003  0.95  1.45  9.6
MYdm Tnack  32.37  2.70  2.00  0 50o  161  16  177  274  32  306  102.7  0.08  0.59  0 21  0.11  0.26  1.26  33.63  0.03  1.03  2.30  4.1
HBy SY  k Tnxk  39.13  2.00  2.50  2.6000  204  20  224  408  50  4sS  582.4  0.08  2.66  0.96  0.13  0.32  4.16  43.29  0.03  1.33  5.49  12.3
Hvy Tant  Tck  39.13  2.00  3.00  5.380  12  1  13  24  3  27  69.9  0.08  s.so  1.99  0.13  0.39  8.09  47.22  0.03  1.45  9.54  1.2
AztlcTnaek  75.78  2.00  3.00  6.eoo  133  7  140  266  21  287  952.0  0.08  6.95  2.52  0.13  0.39  10.07  S5.85  0.03  2.64  12.70  17.8
as  62.38  2.00  3.00  0.49ML  125  63  188  250  189  439  92.1  0.08  0.50  0.18  0.33  0.39  1.29  63.67  0.02  1.42  271  5.1
SpecalW  Vclek  62.38  1.50  1.50  0.490D  220  7S  29  330  117  447  146.0  0.08  0.50  0.38  0.30  0.19  1.06  63.44  0.03  1.95  3.01  90
Thata  4US  242s  7310  s8D2  2761  8563  3026.6  TOWl ter  U  40.2  91.8
Nol=  Hay  doc'axle  SwA  km  11  sa w_  VOCt - beavy AM-alde  tIucka,  an  l  VAts  have  m  s  VOC  "  htes.
Soww Qc  ,ty. cda  1988)35
3Then  Jstiflcation  for the latter procedure is  that freight transport, being an
intermediate  good, should  not be subjected  to any form of pure taxation (Newbery, et al, 1988,
pp. 37-38).23/  It is not clear these principles are applicable in a developing country like
Tunisia. Quite apart from the theoretical  conditions  which underlie  the proposition  - there are
constant retums to scale and perfect competition  - the principle is only applicable  in countries
with well-developed  tax systems (ideally those operating  a value added tax system) with broad
tax bases and where most final sales bear tax (Myles, 1989).  In countries like Tunisia, with
narrow tax bases and weak tax administration,  it is often not possible  to tax all final goods and
services. There is then a strong  argument for levying positive taxes on intermediate  goods and
services as a means of taxing final sales indirectly.
Table 6.  User Charges Calculated Using Avoidable Costs Compared with Those Used in Tunisia
(Cents/veh Ion and $, million)
Higher RevenLies
From Table  S  Current Charges
Mark-up  Applied to  No Pure Taxation of
All Vehicles  Freight Vehicles
User  TotAl  User  Total  User  Total  Uier  Total
Chargc  Revenue  Charge  Revenue  Charge  Revenue  Charge  Revenue
Vehicle Type  (c/veh km)  (S,mill)  (c/veh km)  ($,mnill)  (c'veh  km)  (S,mill)  (c/veh km)  (S,mill)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  7)  (8)
I Gasoline  0.52  11.8  2.25  51.4  7.91  180.8  10.59  241.9
1 Diesel  0.46  3.4  1.74  13.1  5.94  44.8  5.26  39.7
2 Utility  0.68  17.5  3.54  91.0  0.68  17.5  0.59  15.2
3 LightT  1.45  9.5  8.38  55.2  145  Q c  !.77  !!.7
4 Medium T  2.30  4.1  9.84  17.4  2.30  4.1  2.28  4.0
5a Hvy Sgle T  5.49  12.3  15.20  34.0  5.49  12.3  2.91  6.5
5b Hvy Tandem  9.54  1.2  20.13  2.6  9.54  1.2  3.02  0.4
6 Antic  12.70  17.8  31.96  44.7  12 10  17 8  7.50  10.5
7 Bus  2.71  5.1  13.18  24 R  47  T)  RR  I  JG
8 Special  3.01  8.9  17.24  51.4  3.01  8.9  1148  34.2
Total Revenue (a)  91.6  385.7  385.7  385.7
64.  The relevant  comparisons  in Table  6 are therefore  between  columns  3 (all vehicles
charged according to the same avoidable  cost methodology)  and 5 (no pure taxation  of freight
oT%  Newbery,  eta , sa the chargcs  on trucks equal  to marginal  costs. In other  words,  trucks made no contribution  either
to fixed  costs,  or to  pure  taxaion. This  may  be valid  in  an economy  where  all sectors  charge  marginal  costs,  but  is
not valid in Tunisia where the railways  (which  mainly  carry freight)  have to recover all their costs from  users.36
vehicles)  on the one hand and column  7 on the other (the current user charges used in Tunisia).
There are significant  differences  between  columns  3 and 7, but less difference  between columns
5 and 1.  When the mark-ups are applied to all vehicles they result in lower charges for cars,
higher charges for trucks and roughly the same charge for buses.  Without pure taxation of
freight vehicles, the charges for most vehicles are roughly the same.  They are, nevertheless,
much higher for buses, lower for gasoline cards and higher for heavy trucks.37
VIM.  OTHR  ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS
65.  There are,  as mentioned in the introduction, several other issues relevant to
charging for roads which have not been dealt with in the present paper.  It has not dealt with
distributional  issues (i.e. the way user charges affect income distribution  and what to do about
it), fiscal considerations  (i.e., what contribution  the road sector should  make  to the govemment's
overall fiscal revenues), or with the question  of which charging  instruments  to use and how to
charge for accidents, noise, air pollution  and other externalities. It has also ignored, other than
in relation to congestion charges, the important relationship between the choice of pricing
strategy and the impact this has on management  incentives  and hence on the costs of supplying
road services.  These are all important  issues which, though not covered in the present paper,
need to be addressed when designing  road user charges.
66.  The above analysis has, however, pointed to several important  conclusions  for
policies on charging for roads.
(i)  It is unrealistic to assume, for the road network as a  whole, that there are
constant returns to scale in road construction  and in road use.  Road maintenance
costs also contain a number  of fixed costs which do not vary with traffic (up to
half the annual expenditures  and road maintenance  are usually  fixed).
(ii)  Roads  cannot be smoothly  adjusted to traffic, so that marginal  costs for the entire
road network are  significantly lower than average costs in  most developing
countries.  Congestion  charges will therefore generate insufficient revenues to
cover all fixed costs. Congestion  in a few large cities is nevertheless  sufficiently
serious to warrant congestion  charges.  While this ma) help  to recover the fixed
costs of congested  urban roads, the revenues  are unlikely  to cover the fixed  costs
of the road netwo.k as a whole.
(iii)  Under the above conditions,  optimal road user charges will generate insufficient
revenues to cover the capital costs of the road network  and total expenditures  on
road maintenance.
(iv)  Since it is not economically  efficient to bridge the financing  gap by cutting back
on maintenance,  it has to be bridged  by collecting  the required  revenues by taxing
beneficiaries, raising user charges, or  by  mobilizing additional general tax
revenues. Taxes on beneficiaries  were not examined  in the present  paper, but are
usually the preferred method  of charging for residential streets and rural access
roads.  For roads carrying significant  volumes of traffic, the choice is generally
between user charges and  general tax  revenues.  The costs  of  mobilizing
additional general tax revenues are, however, high and, given the generally  low38
price elasticity of demand for roads, it is nearly always more economically
efficient to collect the required revenues from road users.
(v)  While it is generally  agreed  that marginal  costs, corresponding  to variable costs,
should  be the floor below  which user charges should  never fall, there is no reason
to stop at marginal  costs. An important  group of costs are avoidable,  attributable
to individual  groups of users (though  not to the individual  users themselves)  and
it  seems  reasonable  - on  grounds  of  simplicity,  equity  and  political
expediency  - to charge these costs against each individual user group.  The
remaining costs, although also avoidable, are  common to  all  users and,  to
minimize  loss of consumer  surplus, should be charged to them using the inverse
elasticity rule.
(vi)  There are significant  differences between the user charges calculated using the
avoidable  cost methodology  and current user charges in Tunisia.39
Annex 1
Calculation  of Congestion  Costs for Tunisia
1.  In equilibrium,  road user charges  are equal to the optimum  congestion  charge  plus
variable road maintenance  costs.  When the congestion  charge exceeds the costs of expanding
road capacity, capacity should  be expanded  until the road is again back in equilibrium  (Walters,
1968, p 31).  In other words, roads should be expanded  when the sum of marginal  congestion
costs equals the annualized  costs of expanding  road capacity. Congestion  costs should  therefore
always be less than the annualized  costs of expanding  road capacity unless  there are physical or
environmental constraints which allow congestion to  rise  beyond the point where normal
benefit/cost analysis justifies additional investment.  This  Annex examines the  costs  of
congestion  in Tunisia on:  (i) inter-urban  roads; and (ii) urban roads.
Inter-Urban Roads 1/
2.  The nature of the inter-urban road network in Tunisia is summarized  in Table
A.  1, which shows  the amount of traffic using roads of different  widths. A simple  rule-of-thumb
is that narrow roads (less than 5.5 m wide), carrying more than 2,000 vehicles  per day, usually
require widening (i.e. widening  will usually be economically  justified), while two-lane roads
carrying more than 5,000 vehlicles  per day will usually  justify improvement  to dual-carriageway
standard.  In other words, 58 krn of roads shown in Table A. 1 may  justify widening and 141
km may  justify expansion  to dual-carriageway  standard. In Tunisia, road widening  costs about
$50,000 per km (at  1982 prices), while construction of a dual-carriageway  road, effectively
adding  a second  two-lane  road to an existing  one, costs about $280,000  per km (excluding  major
structuresl.
3.  In addition, as shown in Table A.2, there is measurable  congestion  on a further
1,313 km of 5.5 m wide road (971 +  342 kin), on 1,300 km of 5.5-7.5 km road (615 + 527
+  158) and on 71 kn  of road wider than 7.5 m.  If these sections of road are weighted
according to the marginal congestion costs shown in Table A ?  (iving  en ennminatOrs, the
threshold values of  0.32,  0.43 and  0.35 respectively shown in  the  table), the equivalent
congested road length becomes 467, 326 and 72 km respectively.  Applying the figure of
$50,000 to the 467 kn of road less than 5.5 m wide, and $280,000 to the remaining  398 km,
results in a total cost of $134.8 million.  This translates into an annualized cost, using an 8
percent discount rate and a 20 year repayment  period, of $13.68 million. The annual costs of
congestion  on inter-urban  roads should  therefore not exceed this figure. This estimate  compares
favorably with the figure of $12.4 calculated  by Newbery, et al, 1988.
I/  Soures: Paeton,  1985;  Newbey,  1986.40
Annex 1
UIran Roads a'
4.  Urban traffic conditions  in Tunisia are summarized  in Table A.3.  Traffic flows
are nco,  particularly  high - except for three sections  of road (two in Sfax and one in Tunis)
carrying over 5,000 vpd - although some narrow roads are carying  traffic volumes high
enough to cause some  congestion. Until 1982, little investment  was undertaket'  to relieve  urban
road congestion, other  than on  modest traffic management schemes.  By 1984, however,
congestion  had become  a serious problem  in parts of Tunis and Sfax and a Highway  Master Plan
was prepared to help reduce urban road congestion. This resulted in an investment program
costing  $34.31 million, at 1983  prices, with an economic  rate of return of 36 percent. Although
it is difficult  to measure congestion, the Master Plan estimated that, with the amount of traffic
expected  in 1986, the total amount  of travel time would  amount to about 37,817 PCE hrs during
the six-hour daily peak period and that vehicles  would  be travelling  at an average  speed of 19.5
km/hr.  If  there  was no  congestion  - and  traffin speeds were  determined only  by the
configuration  of the road network, pedestrian  activity. parking and other sources of road-side
friction - traffic speeds could rise to about 30 km/hr in the central city area andi  45 km/hr in
the suburbs.  In Singapore, the area licensing scheme introduced in  1975, only managed to
increase travel speeds by about 20 percent (World Bank, 1986, Box 1).  Average speeds could
therefore  rise from 19.5 km/hr to about 35 km/hr, saving  about 16,775  PCE hrs per day (37,817
- 21,042).  When this time is valued at the average time-cost of $3.06 per hour (vehicle
operating costs, plus the value of personal travel time), and expanded by  300 to  give the
equivalent  annual cost, it results in a total cost of $15.40 million.
5.  The estimate  of $15.40 million  p.a. in 1986  looks reasonable  in relation to the 36
percent rate of return earned on urban road investments  costing $34.31 million  at 1983 prices.
The costs of urban congestion  in Tunis (i.e., the sum of the marginal congestion costs) would
have been somewhat lower in  1982, but a  rough figure of  $15 million does not appear
unreasonable.  However, there would also have been some congestion in Sfax (population
310,000 compared to 1.2 million  in Tunis).  On the assumption  that this congestion  amounted
to atout a third of that in Tunis, total urban congestion  in Tunisia  probably amounted  to about
$20 million  in 1982. This is much lower than the figure of 122 million  estimated  by Newbery,
et al,  1988.  If the costs of congestion  really were as high as $122 million, it would  justify
spending  about $1,202 million (using  an 8 percent discount rate and 20-year repayment  period)
to relieve  traffic congestion. This looks implausible  compared  to the investment  program of only
$34.31 million  which was found to be economically  justified in Tunis.
V/  Sources: World Bank,  i984.41
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Tawle  A 1.1:  Loath  of ib  Cksai&.  Intara  Fava  d
(Km, 1982)
Width  of  Road  (meters)
Traffic  AADT  Peak  Road  ------  ---------------  --------
Class  (Veh/day)  PCE/hr  Length  X  <5.5  5.5-7.5  >7.5  All
...  .........  .........  ..........  ......  ...  ..  ........  . ....  ......  . .............  .........
Ti  )  16.1  971  258  1,229
T2  )  1,000  - 45.6  2,332  1,114  35  3,480
T3  1,000  112  21.2  971  615  32  1,618
T4  2  032  227  11.5  342  527  9  878
TS  3,750  419  3.7  54  158  71  282
T6  )  8,525  953
T7  )  12,000  1,342  1.9  4  87  54  145
............  ....................  ...........  .................  ...........  .........
100.0  4,674  2,758  200  7,637
sources:  Road Lengths  (Paterson,  1985,  Table  1.5),  AADT  and
Peak  Flows  (Newbery,  1986,  Tables  5 and  7).
Table A 1.2:  Deroe of Coneation  and  !&mth  of  Inlt-Urban  Road Affecedd  by Co  o
(Vehicle brs/100 PCE kim)
Width  of Road  (meters)
Traffic  AADT  Peak  Road  ...................................
Class  (veh/day) PCE/hr Length  X  (5.5  m  5.5-7.5  m  >7.5  m
..  . . ..  . ......  .........  . ..  ..  . ........  ..  .......
TI  )  16.1  0.00  0.00  0.00
T2  )  *1,000  45.6  0.00  0.00  0.00
T3  1,000  112  21.2  0.08  0.05  0.00
T4  2,032  227  11.5  0.16  0.07  0.00
T5  3,750  419  3.7  0.32  0.15  0.09
T6  )  8 525  953  - 0.43  0.22
T7  )  12.000  1,342  1.9  0.56  0.35
congested  Roads  (km)  (a)  467  326  72
Notes:  (a)  Road length,  from  A 1.1,  weighted  by degree  of
congestion.  The marginal  congestion  costs  which
justify  expanding  road  capacity  have  been  taken
as  0.32,  0.43  and 0.35  respectiveLy.
Sources:  As for  Table  A 1.1;  Marginel  Congestion  Costs
(Newbery,  1986,  Table  9).42
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Tabk A 1M3:  Sma  of MIM  IJr  Road Com  in  m  a
Length  of  Road  Amount of  Travwl
AADT  - - V.  ..  .Notes
(veh/day)  (km)  per  cent  vkm p.  a.  per  cent
......................................  ..............  .........  .........  .............  .............  .......  ........  ...............
<  2,000  380  21.0  631  24.7
2,000  - 2,999  796  44.1  614  24.0
3,000  - 3,999  436  24.1  809  31.7
4,010  - 4,999  116  6.4  169  6.6
5,G,0  - 5,999  26  1.4  95  3.7  One road  in  Sfax.
6,000  52  2.9  236  9.2  One road  each  in
Tunis  and Sfax.
1,806  2,554
Sources:  (Paterson,  1985,  Tables  1.6,  1.7  and  1.8).43
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Recent Estimates of the Price Elasticity of Demand for Transpor
1.  The following  tables summarize seventy  estimates  of the price elasticity of demand for
transport published  in recent journal articles (Oum,  et al, 1990). The estimates  are drawn from
several countries: 32 studies in U.S.A., 8 in Canada, 8 in U.K., 3 in the rest of Europe, 7 in
Australia  and New Zealand, 2 in India  and Pakistan  and 8 in other countries. They cover many
different  transport modes  and market  situations,  and employ  different  statistical  methods  and data
bases.
2.  Tables A3.1 and A3.2 summarize the ordinary own-price elasticities of demand for
passenger and freight transport.  Table A3. 1 also presents mode choice elasticities which can
be linked to ordinary demand elasticities if sufficient information is available.  These mode
choice elasticities are not directly comparable to the ordinary own-price elasticities.  Mode
choice own-price  elasticities  are less than ordinary own-price  elasticities  and this has been taken
into account in the "most likely" range of ordinary elasticities.
3.  Table A3.3 summarizes  information  on the ordinary own-price  elasticity of demand for
gasoline, while Table A3.4 presents selected cross-price  elasticity estimates from studies with
a relatively  high degree  of aggregation  (they  are thus more representative  of average  conditions).
4.  It was not possible to categorize the estimates into short run or long run elasticities.
Most studies make no reference to the implied time horizon. As a rough guide, cross-sectional
data sets are thought to represent  long run relationships,  whereas  time series data (especiaUy  if
monthly  or quarterly  data are used) reflect short run demand relationships. However, this is not
an unambiguous  guide and panel data sets (combined  cross-section  and time series data) further
complicates  interpreting the time dimension  of elasticity estimates.  The most likely range of
elasticities  is therefore  ambiguous  concerning  the implied  time horizon, although  the upper  range
probably comes closest to being a long run rather than a short run elasticity.
5.  Most of the estimates  presented relate to developed  countries, reflecting the availability
of  data, research resources and domicile of the researchers.  The elasticity estimates are
nevertheless thought to be relevant to developing countries as weUl. But since intermodal
competition  is generally  less intense  in developing  countries, this tends  to make  transport demand
more inelastic, although for passenger  transport the lower income levels in such couritries may
partly offset this effect.
6.  In  the  case of  freight transport, the  incidence of  intermodal competition is  more
significant. The studies of road and rail are all based on data from the U.S. and Canada where
most freight traffic is subject to strong intermodal competition. The aggregate demand44
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elasticities  (-0.8 for rail and -0.9 for truck) must therefore be regarded as the upper limit of the
demand elasticity when there is strong intermo& competition. When there is no competition,
the derived price elasticity  is likely to provide a better estimate of the elasticity of demand for
transport. Provided the elasticity of supply approaches  infinity, the derived elasticity is equal
to e =  f' e', where e represents  the derived  elasticity  of demand for transport,  e'  is the demand
elasticity  for final goods  and services  and f is the fraction  of the demand  price spent  on transport
(Bennathan  and Walters, 1969, Technical Appendix). In the case of road transport, f amounts
to about 10 to 20 percent of the delivered  price and e' generally  varies from -0.4 (food  products)
to -0.8 (miscellaneous  goods and services) (Chetty and Haliburn, 1982).  Since the low value
of f  corresponds to  the low value of e,  the derived price elasticity of demand for freight
transport, corresponding  to the demand elasticity without any intermodal competition,  is thus
about -0.04.45
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Ta_I_ A2.1:  El_idtlu  of Dan  d for Pm  =  Tnsor
(All elasticity flgures are negative)
RANGE  SURVEYED
Market  demand  Mode  choice  Most  likely  No.  of
Mode  elasticities  elasticities  ange  sudeshi
AIr:  1I
Vacation  0.40-4.60  0.38  1.10-2.70  8
Non-vacation  0.08-4.18  0.18  0.40-1.20  6
Mixed b/  0.44-4.51  0.26-5.26  0.70-2.10
Rail:  intercitv
Leisure  1.40  1.20  1.40-1.60  2
Business  0.70  0.57  0.60-0.70  2
Mixed b/  0.11-1.54  0.86-1.14  0.30-1.18  8
Rail: intracity
Peak  0. IS  0.22-0.25  0.20-0.40  2
Off peak  1.00  n.a.  <1.00  1
All day b/  0.12-1.80  0.08-0.75  0.1  00.70  4
Automobile:
Peak  0.12-0.49  0.02-2.69  0.10-0.70  9
Off peak  0.06-0.88  0.16-0.96  0.20-1.10  6
All day h/  0.00-0.52  0.01-1.26  0.10-1.10  7
Bus:
Peak  0.00  0.034.58  0.10-0.70  6
Off peak  1.08-1.54  0.010.69  0.10-1.10  3
AD day  0.10-1.62  0.03-0.70  0.10-1.30  11
RaDid  transit:
All day b/  0.05-0.86  n.a.  0.20-0.90  5
Transit system:
Peak  0.00-0.29  0.1  0.10-0.30  4
Off peak  0.32-1.00  n.a.  0.30-0.50  3
AUl  day b/  0.014.96  n.a.  0.10-0.70  10
Othe:
Minibus  n.a.  n.a.  1
Airersft  12ntlino  0.06-0.56  n.a.  - i
l  IeThe  disdnction  between  vacation  and non-vacation  routes are rather arbitrary in
most studies. MTis  nay partly account  for the very wide  mnge of elasticity
estimates  reported.
h/  This category includes  studies  that do not make the distinctions.
The number  of studies  in the column  do not sum  to the total because  some
studies report more than one set of estimates.
u.s. = not available46
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TCable  A2.2:  Elasticities of  eand  for Freiah  Tran  ot
(All elasticity  figur  are negative)
Mide  RwV NWYUJUi  Mu  Lhkdy  Eaqe  No of susie
A"regate Commodities  0.60-1.52  0.40.1.20  4
(0.09-1.79)
Assembled  Automobiles  0.65-1.08  0.70-1.10  2
Chemical  0.39-2.25  0.40-0.70  3
(0.66)
Coal  0.02-1.04  0.10-0.40  2
Corn,  wheat, etc.  0.52-1.18  0.50-1.20  3
Fetilizers  0.02-1.04  0.10.1.00  1
Foods  0.02-2.58  0.30-1.00  9
(1.36)
Lumber,  pulp, paper,  etc.  0.05-1.97  0.10-0.7C  7
(0.76-0.87)
Machinery  0.61-3.55  IV  0.60-2.30  3
Paper, plastic  and
rubber  products  0.17-1.85  0.20-1.00  4
Prinary metals  and
metallic  products  0.02-2.54  W/  1.00-2.20  5
(1.57)
Refined  petroleum  products  0.53-0.99  0.50-1.00  3
Stone, clay  and  glas products  0.82-1.62  0.80-1.70  4
(0.69)
Aggregate  commodities  0.05-1.34  0.70-1.10  1
Assembled  Automobiles  0.52-0.67  0.50-0.70  1
Chemicals  0.98-2.31  1.00-1.90  2
Corn,  wheat, etc.  0.73-0.99  0.70-1.00  2
Foods  0.32-1.54  0.50-1.30  3
Lumber,  wood,  etc.  0.14-1.55  0.10-0.60  3
Machinery  0.04-1.23  0.10-1.20  3
Prinary metals  and
metalic  products  0.1S-1.36  0.30-1.10  3
Paper, plastic  and
rubber  products  1.05-2.97  1.10-3.00  2
Refined  petoleum products  0.52-0.66  0.50-0.70  3
Stone,  clay and glaus  product  1.03-2.17  ,/  1.00-2.20  2
Textila  0.43-07  0.40-0.80  1
Aggregate commodities  0.82-1.00  0.80-1.60  3
Shinnina:  inland  watewav  bi
Aggregate  ocommodities  (0.74-0.75)  - 1
Chemicals  0.75  - 1
Cool  0.28  - 1
Cmue  poleum  1.49  - 1
ar3a  0.64-1.62  0.60-1.60.,  2
Lumber  and wod  0.60
Noometa  om  0.55  1
Primay mew  0.28  1
Pulpandp pr  1.12  1
Stone, clay  and las prducs  1.22  1
Dry bulk  shipment  r1  0.06-0.25  1
Foods  0.20.0.31  1
Liquid  bulk  shipmet  0.21  1
Geel  cargo  0.00-1.10  1
Al  Tho high  eliciy  timate my  reflct  the mode's  low mar*et har  of aggregat  fight
when using  the tnslog  co  fution  in estation.
W  There have  beo  very ew empical studie on shippig,  oenoc  the elasticity  estima
reported er  shouM  be  n  d  with caution.
g/  Thus include  coal, grin,  iron ore and  concentae,  dc.
Not  gures  in  nze  are mode choi"e  elasiie.47
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Table  A23:  _lWiso  eadE!MI
(An  ugynues  ame  nWve)
Cowi7  Range  Ssrved  Most L;ky  Range  No of dud;s
Austria  0 25-0.27  1
Canada  0.11  1
Isdel  0.25  1
U.K.  0.1-0.17  1
U.S.  0.04-0.21  1
West Germany  0.25-0.93  1
Multicountry Studies  0.20-1.37  1/  0.20-0.50  3
A/  Inc]  ded in this range is a long-run elasticity estimate of 0.32-1.37
Table A2.4:  Seleced Eadimates  of Cro.  Elastitdties
(Apte  Da)
Authors  Modes  Cross Elasticities A/  Remarks
Oum  (1979a)  Rail-truck  -0.10  to  +0.14  Aggregate freight transport
Truck-ril  -0.88  to +0.13  demand in Canada, cross
Rail-waterway  +0.15  to +0.20  elasticities reported for
Waterway-rail  +0.61  to +0.86  selected years between
Truckr-waterway  -0.23  to  +0.03  1950-1974.
Waterway-truck  -0.12  to +0.13
Oum and  Air-bus  -0.02  to -0.01  Aggregate intercity
Giilen (193)  Air-rail  +0.01  to +0.04  passerger  transport
Bus-air  -0.12  to -0.05  demand in Canada, cross
Bus-ail  -0.47  to  -0.21  elasticities reported for
Busir  +0.08  to +0.51  selected years between
Rail-bus  -1.18  to -0.17  1961-1976.
Oum  (1989)  Rai-truck  k/  -0.18  to +0.50  Interregional freight
Truck-ail  /  -0.62  to  +0.84  transport demand in
Rail-Twck  g/  -0.47  to +0.48  Canada.
Truck-il  g/  -0.26  to  +0.35
a/  When te  cross elticity  is negative, it moans the two modes are competitors. Raising  the price of one
then divaes traffic to the other.  When the cross elasticity  is positive,  the modes  are complements  (e.g.,
piggy-bck road/rail traffic). Raising  the price of one then causes  both modes  to lose traffic.
hi  Aggregde commodities.
C/ Fruits, vegetables  and other edible  foods.48
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